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1. INTRODUCTION 
Approximately ten million Americans today live in some 60,000 
housing developments l subsidized by the U.S. Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development (HUD). HUD administers four major 
subsidy programs: conventional family projects, elderly projects, 
privately owned developments with rent supplements and/or mort-
gage subsidies, and privately owned "Section 8" housing. 2 The evi-
I Flournoy & Rodrigue, Separate and Unequal: Illegal Segregation Pervades Nation's Subsidized 
Housing, Dallas Morning News, Feb. 10, 1985, at lA, col. 1 [hereinafter Flournoy & Rodrigue, 
Separate and Unequal]. The authors published this article as part of a week-long series on 
public housing segregation, drawing on thousands of HUD documents obtained through 
Freedom of Information Act requests. 
2 From 1937 to 1964 the federal government funded the construction of 540,000 sub-
sidized apartments, principally conventional family projects. From 1964 to 1984, public 
housing authorities built with federal funds over 3.3 million new units, including 750,000 
units in conventional housing projects, approximately 830,000 rental/mortgage subsidy units 
121 
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dence of racial segregation and inequality in these programs is 
overwhelming. Since 1962, when eighty percent of federally sup-
ported developments were completely segregated,3 little has 
changed. For example, the latest available data indicate that seventy-
one percent of African-American public housing tenants live in 
developments over eighty-five percent African-American in com-
position.4 
Government agency decisions at the local and federal levels 
have created or contributed to this racial separation. Local public 
housing authorities (PH As) have disproportionately placed whites 
in the newer developments, in particular elderly housing, often 
located in the suburbs.5 This practice has confined minorities to the 
oldest public housing stock, the conventional family projects built 
in the central cities.6 PHAs have also fostered segregation through 
and 1. 7 million Section 8 units. The Section 8 housing project program terminated in 1974 
but HlJD continues to honor the subsidy contracts existing at that time. Id. at 25A, col. 1. 
3 114 CONGo REc. 2280 (1968) (statement of Sen. Brooke). 
I Flournoy & Rodrigue, Fair Housing Failure: 5 Administrations Have Refused to Enforce 
Anti-disaimination Laws, Dallas Morning News, Feb. 15, 1985, at 16A, col. 1 [hereinafter 
Flournoy & Rodrigue, Fair Housing Failure]. HUD survey data from 1977 indicate that 41 % 
of white households lived in "racially identifiable" projects, that is, over 85% white. In another 
study, 80% of the projects varied at least 15% from the overall racial mix of the public 
housing authority. Id. Examples from the cases paint an equally stark picture. In East Texas 
a federal court found that of 219 projects examined, 199 were over 75% one race, including 
121 100% segregated. Young v. Pierce, 628 F. Supp. 1037, 1044 (E.D. Tex. 1985), afl'd, 822 
F.2d 1376 (5th Cir. 1987). In Philadelphia, a court found that of 50 projects, 40 were over 
65% African-American and 6 were over 90% white. Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 425 F. 
Supp. 987, 1007-08 (E.D. Pa. 1976), afl'd in part, rev'd in part, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977), 
art. denied, 435 U.s. 908 (1978). In Boston, a Boston Housing Authority study found that 
of 61 projects, 33 were "extremely imbalanced," being over 90% of one race, compared to a 
roughly 50-50 racial mix for the total public housing population. Mooney, Wide Imbalance 
Found at 33 Projects, Boston Globe, Feb. 19, 1988, at 1, col. 1 [hereinafter Mooney]. 
5 Flournoy & Rodrigue, Separate and Unequal, supra note 1, at 24A, col. 1, 25A, col. 1, 
26A, col. 1. For example, of the 580,000 Section 8 apartments constructed between 1975 to 
1984, whites now occupy 85% of these units. and the elderly occupy 71 %. The latest HUD 
data show that two-thirds of all elderly units are white-occupied. Id. at 25A, col. 5. PHAs 
have clearly slanted public housing construction towards the elderly. In 1964 the elderly 
occupied 26% of all federally supported apartments. In 1984 they occupied 53% of all units 
built since 1964, including 51 % of all Section 8 units, while consisting of only 23% of the 
population eligible for Section 8. Id. As an example of segregation by program, in 36 counties 
in East Texas, 76% of Section 8 new construction units went to whites, while 77% of rent! 
mortgage supplement apartments went to African-Americans. Young V. Pierce, 628 F. Supp. 
at 1044. This close correlation between racial occupancy and type of program is not coinci-
dental. In setting construction priorities overwhelmingly in favor of Section 8 elderly housing, 
PH As knew that, compared to white applicants for subsidized housing, the demand from 
African-American applicants was disproportionately greater for family housing. Flournoy & 
Rodrigue, Separate and Unequal, supra note 1, at 25A, col. 1, 26A, col. 1. 
" Flournoy & Rodrigue, Separate and Unequal, supra note 1, at 25A-26A. 
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the construction of public housing in racially identifiable neighbor-
hoods. 7 The PHAs have then selected and assigned tenants so as to 
perpetuate the existing racial segregation of the surrounding com-
munity.s Virtually all PHAs provide inferior services and lower 
capital expenditures for predominantly minority developmentsY 
Urban housing shortages, rising rents, and pervasive private hous-
ing discrimination 10 have sharply limited the choices of low-income 
minority renters, II forcing them to accept discriminatory, substan-
dard living conditions in public housing. 
HUD is complicit in this system of public housing segregation 
through its financial support and its failure to pursue adequate 
remedies. For example, every year HUD reviews approximately 
eighty of the nation's 3,000 PHAsl2 to determine their compliance 
with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 13 At this pace, HUD 
would need thirty-seven years to review all PHAs. More important, 
HUD's compliance reviews do not actually remedy segregation. For 
example, fourteen years after HUD's 1974 compliance review and 
settlement agreement with the Boston Housing Authority, well over 
half of public housing in Boston remained segregated. 14 Nationally, 
HUD has never even surveyed all federally subsidized housing to 
determine the extent of segregation. 15 In the words of a HUD 
consultant, the agency is "deeply involved in the creation of the 
ghetto system, and it has never committed itself to any remedial 
action."16 
7 [d. at 25A, col. J. 
8 See Flournoy & Rodrigue, Fair Housing Failure, supra note 4, at l6A, col. J. 
" Federal studies have documented a significant disparity of services between (mostly 
minority) family projects versus (mostly white) elderly ones. A 1979 report on 1,500 projects 
found that 92% of the "bad" or "very bad" condition projects were family ones, "old, large, 
located in urban areas .... " Flournoy & Rodrigue, Separate and Unequal, supra note 1, at 
26A, col. J. PHAs consciously neglected the family projects as whites moved out and they 
became predominantly minority-occupied. [d. The general counsel of HUD acknowledged 
in 1985 that mostly minority projects have worse physical conditions, fewer amenities, and 
fewer social services. [d. at 24A, col. J. 
iO E.g., Quill, Housing Discrimination Cited by Survey, Boston Globe, Mar. 28, 1984, at 17, 
col. J. 
11 For example, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has found that the lack of safe, 
desegregated housing in white areas of Boston curtails African-American citizens' housing 
opportunities. NAACP, Boston Chapter v. Secretary of HUD, 817 F.2d 149, 151 (1987). 
12 Voluntary Desegregation Options Part oj New Compliance Program OJJered to PHAs, 16 HOllS. 
& Dev. Rep. (WGL) 343, 344 (1988). 
13 42 U.s.c. §§ 2000d-I-5 (1982). 
14 Mooney, supra note 4, at 1. 
15 Flournoy & Rodrigue, Separate and Unequal, supra note 1, at 26A, col. 1. 
16 [d. at 24A, col. J. 
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This Note analyzes the potential liability of HUD for illegally 
causing the segregation of federally supported public housing by 
authorizing public housing applicants to choose among possible 
projects. While the Supreme Court in the 1968 case of Green v. 
County School Board l7 essentially forbade similar choice policies in 
the context of public school desegregation,18 the courts have failed 
to check segregation through individual choice in the public housing 
field. Despite this judicial inaction, there is a strong possibility that 
HUD's policies allowing applicant choice make the agency liable for 
deliberately maintaining a national system of segregation in public 
housing. 
In exploring this thesis, this Note focuses on the issue of cau-
sation in a hypothetical national class action suit brought by public 
housing tenants and eligible applicants (plaintiffs) against HUD.19 
As a simplification, the hypothetical class action covers only HUD's 
regulation of PHAs. Much of the analysis, however, also applies to 
HUD's relationship with private owners of federally subsidized 
housing.20 The plaintiffs allege that HUD caused and continues to 
cause public housing segregation by authorizing tenant selection 
and assignment plans (TSAPs) which allow individuals applying for 
subsidized housing to choose the location of their public housing 
residence. Proof of such causation would satisfy the chief element 
of a cause of action under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1968.21 It would fulfill one element of a complaint brought under 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the fourteenth amend-
ment to the U.S. Constitution. 22 
Initially, the analysis traces a history of public housing segre-
gation, federal policy allowing individual choice in assigning tenants 
to apartments, and litigation over this policy. Because Title VIII, 
also known as the Fair Housing Act of 1968, provides for a causation 
analysis similar to Title VI's, HUD's special duties and liabilities 
under both Title VI and Title VIII are discussed. Although HUD 
17 391 U.S. 430. 
18Id. at 440-41. 
19 Such a class action suit is possible. See Cnderwood v. Hills, 414 F. Supp. 526, 528, 531 
(D.D.C. 1976). afl'd, 429 U.S. 892 (1976) (national class of public housing tenants successfully 
sued HUD to enforce mandatory payment of operating subsidies). 
20 See infra notes 37, 68, 119, 176-98 and accompanying text. 
2142 U.S.c. §§ 3601-3631 (1982). 
22 A subsequent article will discuss whether HUD intentionally segregated public housing 
through applicant choice TSAPs. Such intent would complete the essential elements of a 
cause of action under Title VI or the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. 
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has important defenses, the stronger, more persuasive legal theories 
support plaintiffs' arguments that Hun has implemented policies 
of individual applicant choice so as to cause public housing segre-
gation. Throughout this analysis, competing judicial philosophies 
about civil rights law underlay the legal issue of the appropriate 
standard of causation in determining HUn's liability for segregation 
maintenance. 
II. PUBLIC HOUSING SEGREGATION, TENANT SELECTION PLANS AND 
ApPLICANT CHOICE 
A. Desegregation Litigation and Tenant Selection and Assignment Plans 
Hun must approve all PHAs' tenant selection and assignment 
plans (TSAPs). These are the formal regulations for accepting and 
reviewing applications for public housing, setting eligibility criteria 
such as income levels, establishing any special preferences, selecting 
qualified applicants, and designating apartments for them to oc-
cupy.23 TSAPs can also provide for transfers of existing tenants to 
new apartments.24 Where a TSAP channels applicants to projects 
so as to create or maintain segregation, HUn has arguably autho-
rized such discrimination. Over the past fifteen years, minority 
plaintiffs in a small number of cases have successfully sued Hun 
for sanctioning illegal racial discrimination by PHAs.25 These cases 
litigated in some depth the issues associated with discriminatory site 
selection of housing projects,26 but failed to examine closely the 
process by which PH As selected tenants for apartments from the 
applicant pools and then assigned them to units. 
This failure to examine discriminatory TSAPs is one reason 
that nominally successful desegregation suits (i.e., where the plain-
23 See 24 C.F.R. § 1.4(b)(2)(ii) (1985); 24 C.F.R. §§ 960.201-211 (1985); HUD, HANDBOOK 
7465.1 REV, REQUIREMENTS FOR ADMINISTRATION OF Low-RENT HOUSING PROGRAMS UNDER 
TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (June 1967, reissued June 1969, reissued 
October 1978) [hereinafter Low-RENT HOUSING HANDBOOK]. 
24 24 C.F.R. § 884.226 (1988). 
25 E.g., Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 425 F. 
Supp. 987 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 
435 U.S. 908 (1978). 
26 Illegal site selection focuses on whether it is discriminatory to build projects only in 
minority areas. E.g., United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987). 
Site selection cases can also turn on whether cross-district remedies are appropriate. E.g., 
Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284. 
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tiffs prevailed) have not desegregated public housing. For example, 
Resident Advisory Board v. Rizz027 centered on the efforts of the mayor 
of Philadelphia, other local elected officials, and HUD representa-
tives to obstruct the construction of one housing project in a white 
area. The U.S. District Court for Eastern Pennsylvania found not 
only that this opposition was racially motivated, but also that the 
Philadelphia Housing Authority's TSAP caused segregation city-
wide. 28 Accordingly, the district court ordered a citywide remedial 
TSAP as well as the construction of the disputed project.29 On 
review, however, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals voided the 
remedial TSAP and required only the construction of the chal-
lenged project. 30 
A careful reading of the district court opinion suggests that the 
TSAP issue was secondary to the plaintiffs' case in Rizzo. The opin-
ion does not reveal what the challenged TSAP required, apart from 
some type of applicant choice.31 The plaintiffs did not marshal 
sufficient evidence and arguments on appeal to prove that the TSAP 
caused segregation. The district court's recognition of the logical 
connection of the TSAP to citywide segregation, however, is a signal 
to future plaintiffs to pursue this strategy more forcefully. 
The constitutional infirmities of site selection theories have also 
undermined plaintiffs' cases. Courts have refused to order the ex-
penditure of funds to construct new housing developments because 
this remedy would have violated the constitutional separation of 
powers. For example, in an Eighth Circuit case, Vann v. Housing 
Authority of Kansas City, Missouri,32 the U.S. District Court for West-
ern Missouri dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint against HUD be-
cause an order forcing the PHA to build housing projects would 
have exceeded judicial authority over the executive branch. 33 Vann 
also found that in the absence of congressional appropriation of 
funds, judicially-ordered construction of new projects impermissibly 
"' 425 F. Supp. 987, aff"d in part, rev'd in part, 564 F.2d 126. 
"" 425 F. Supp. at 987, 1020, 1025. 
20 [d. at 1028. 
30 564 F.2d at 152-53. 
1I 425 F. Supp. at 1007-08, 1020,564 F.2d at 139-40. 
32 87 F.R.D. 642 (W.D. Mo. 1980). 
33 [d. at 666-68; see also Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 807 F.2d 657, 673 (8th Cir. 1986) 
(en bane); United States v. City of Parma, Ohio, 661 F.2d 562, 578-79 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. 
denied, 456 U.S. 926 (1982). But see Perez v. Boston Hous. Auth., 379 Mass. 703, 739-40, 
400 N .E.2d 1231, 1252 (1980) (no constitutional problem with separation of powers, citing 
MASS. CONST. art. XXX). 
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intruded into the legislative sphere.34 InJenkins v. State of Missouri,35 
the Eighth Circuit, in deciding a case combining school and housing 
segregation issues, refused to reach the issue of HUD's liability on 
grounds of federalism. The appellate court, agreeing with the U.S. 
District Court for Western Missouri, reasoned that since the local 
defendants administered the public housing program, their discrim-
ination presumptively superseded any discrimination by HUD.36 
A class action challenge, either local or national, to HUD's 
authorization of discriminatory TSAPs could succeed in ameliorat-
ing public housing segregation where previous efforts have failed. 
Several considerations justify this proposition. Remedies focusing 
on site selection do not necessarily affect TSAPs, and so the process 
of sorting out tenants by race and assigning them to segregated 
developments may continue. Even if non-discriminatory siting of 
newly constructed projects achieves desegregation, this would affect 
only new tenants, leaving the remaining ten million residents of 
subsidized public housing locked into a segregated system. By con-
trast, remedial federal TSAP regulations could require tenant trans-
fers and assignments of new tenants so as to achieve sweeping 
integrative effects.37 
One possible limit on the remedial potential of a national class 
action suit focusing on choice TSAPs is the extent to which PHAs 
have utilized applicant choice. There is apparently no hard data 
proving widespread use of choice TSAPs. However, since virtually 
all the reported public housing segregation cases involve a choice 
TSAP at some point in each PHA's history,38 there is a strong 
presumption of widespread use. 
34 87 F.R.D. at 668 (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, d. 7 forbids judicially ordered housing 
construction where there has been no appropriation by Congress); see also NAACP, Boston 
Chapter v. Kemp, No. 78-850-S, slip op. at 14 (D. Mass. June 23, 1989). 
35 593 F. Supp. 1485 (W.D. Mo. 1984), overruled on other issues sub nom. Jenkins by Agyei 
v. Missouri, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986) (en banc). 
36 [d. at 1498-99, 807 F.2d at 661. 
37 See, e.g., Young v. Pierce, 685 F. Supp. 975, 981 (E.D. Tex. 1988) (judge ordered one 
waiting list for vacancies in all conventional family developments, elderly, section 8, and rent! 
mortgage supplement programs, and authorized group transfers of tenants for integration). 
38 The local governments that have used or are using applicant choice TSAPs include: 
Dallas (Rodrigue, Slums: A Dallas Tradition, Dallas Morning News, Feb. 14, 1985, at 23A, col. 
1); Cleveland (Banks v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175, 1182 (N.D. Ohio 1972)); Philadelphia 
(Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 425 F. Supp. 987, 1028 (E.D. Pa. 1976), afl'd in part, rev'd 
in part, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978)); Chicago (P. DIMOND, 
BEYOND BUSING: INSIDE THE CHALLENGE TO URBAN SEGREGATION 206 (1985) [hereinafter 
DIMOND, BEYOND BUSING]); Kansas City (Vann v. Housing Auth. of Kansas City, Mo., 87 
F.R.D. 642, 653, 657 (W.D. Mo. 1980)); Toledo, Ohio (Jaimes v. Toledo Metro. Hous. Auth., 
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A TSAP-focused suit would also seek a remedy that is much 
less costly and thereby less intrusive on the powers of the legislature 
and executive than housing construction. A judicial order that HUD 
revise its TSAP policy would thus pose relatively little danger of 
violating the separation of powers among the three branches of 
government. 39 Finally, no federalism problem would exist, since the 
remedy would cover only HUD.40 Significantly, in two of the most 
important public housing desegregation victories over the last 
twenty years, Young v. Pierce41 and Hills v. Gautreaux,42 HUD was the 
sole defendant at the time of judgment. In cases such as these, that 
addressed TSAP mechanisms of discrimination and pursued rem-
edies against HUD rather than against local governments or PHAs, 
plaintiffs have successfully effected desegregation. For example, in 
Gautreaux, minority residents of Chicago's public housing system 
forced HUD to require suburban PH As to construct developments, 
funded by HUD, with apartments available to minority Chicago 
applicants.43 While commentators have presented Gautreaux as es-
sentially a siting controversy,44 the key to integrating the new proj-
758 F.2d 1086, 1091 (6th Cir. 1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 833 F.2d 1203 (6th Cir. 1987)); 
Boston (Schmidt v. Boston HOllS. Auth., 505 F. Supp. 988, 995 (D. Mass. 1981)); Akron, 
Ohio (Bell v. Board of Educ., Akron Pub. Schools, 491 F. Supp. 916 (N.D. Ohio 1980), aff'd, 
683 F.2d 963 (6th Cir. 1982)); Austin, Tex. (Blackshear Residents Org. v. Housing Auth. of 
Austin, 347 F. Supp. 1138, 1144-45 (WD. Tex. 1972)); Gadsden, Ala. (United States v. 
Greater Gadsden HOllS. Auth., 1 Equal Opp'y HOlls. (P-H) ~ 13,591, 13,900, 13,901 (N.D. 
Ala., No. 69-36, Mar. 23, 1976)); Savannah, Ga. (Heyward v. Public HOllS. Admin., 238 F.2d 
689, 692 (5th Cir. 1956)); four counties in East Texas (Young v. Pierce, 628 F. Supp. 1037, 
1048-50 (E.D. Tex. 1985), aff'd, 822 F.2d 1368 (5th Cir. 1987)); Chester, Pa. (Pennsylvania 
Human Relations Comm'n v. Chester HOllS. Auth., 458 Pa. 67, 85-86, 327 A.2d 335, 344-
45 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 974 (1975)); and Middleboro, Ky. (Middleboro Hous. Auth. 
v. Kentucky Comm'n on Civil Rights, 553 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977)). In addition, 
the federal government from 1964 to 1967 encouraged all PHAs to utilize a "freedom of 
choice" TSAP. See infra notes 59-66 and accompanying text. 
39 See NAACP, Boston Chapter v. Kemp, No. 78-850-S, slip op. at 18-19 (D. Mass. June 
23, 1989) (while acknowledging First Circuit Court of Appeals' recognition of broad judicial 
authority to compel HUD to issue revised fair housing regulations and guidelines, trial judge 
on remand declined "to add to the existing mountain of federal rules and regulations"). 
41l "An order directed solely to HUD would not force unwilling localities to apply for 
assistance .... " Jaimes v. Toledo Metro. HOllS. Auth., 758 F.2d at 1098-99 (citing Hills v. 
Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 303 (1976)), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 833 F.2d 1203, (6th Cir. 
1987); see also Kemp, No. 78-850-S, slip op. at 15-17. 
41 544 F. Supp. 1010 (E.D. Tex. 1982), aff'd, 822 F.2d 1368 (5th Cir. 1987). 
42 425 U.S. 284, 286, 292 (1976). 
43 Id. at 302-06. 
44 E.g., Days, School Desegregation Law in the 1980's: Why Isn't Anybody Laughing? (book 
review), 95 YALE L.J. 1737, 1754 (1986) [hereinafter Days, School Desegregation Law] (the 
author was Chief of the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice in the Carter 
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ects was the court-ordered assignment of minority applicants. With-
out this remedial TSAP, the suburban PHAs could have easily 
constructed subsidized elderly housing and selected a virtually all-
white tenant population. 
B. A Brief History of Federal Tenant Selection and Assignment Policy 
This Note proposes that HUD causes public housing segrega-
tion by authorizing applicant choice in local TSAPs. Thus, TSAPs 
are not only crucial to fashioning effective remedies, as in Gautreaux, 
but also for proving HUD's underlying liability for causing segre-
gation. The following short history of public housing reveals a close 
association between choice TSAPs and the persistence of public 
housing segregation.45 
Congress initiated the conventional public housing project sys-
tem with the Housing Act of 1937.46 This legislation created a 
national policy of providing low-rent housing to meet the needs of 
low-income citizens unable to obtain decent housing in the private 
market. At the same time Congress created the U.S. Housing Au-
thority to implement the Housing ActY Congress gave the Housing 
Authority limited powers and duties, leaving housing policy largely 
to local government.48 In 1947 the U.S. Housing Authority became 
the Public Housing Administration, part of the Housing and Home 
Finance Agency.49 
Administration); R. Farrell, Integrating by Discriminating: Affirmative Action That Disadvantages 
Minorities, 62 U. OF DETROIT L. REV. 553, 565-69 (1985). 
45 "Applicant choice" and "choice TSAP" in this Note refer to any TSAP allowing 
applicants for public housing a choice among two or more housing developments. Plan B is 
HUD's name for the principal form of a choice TSAP, allowing each applicant three oppor-
tunities to accept or refuse an offer of housing. PIIAs may adopt a hybrid of Plan B with a 
special preference for any applicant choosing to live in a project predominantly of another 
race [hereinafter desegregation preference TSAP]. An applicant exercising this choice can 
receive housing before other applicants with longer tenure on a chronologically ordered 
waiting list. A third form of choice TSAP allows applicants to choose projects at the time of 
initial application, by listing preferences, usually up to three [hereinafter freedom of choice 
TSAP]. The PHA then places the applicant on a separate waiting list for each of the preferred 
projects. A fourth form of choice TSAP allows voluntary transfers of existing tenants to 
achieve desegregation [hereinafter voluntary transfer TSAP]. 
46 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-40 (Supp. II 1978). 
47 Comment, The Public Housing Administration and Discrimination in Federally Assisted Low 
Rent Housing, 64 MICH. L. REV. 871, 871 n.1 (1966) (citing 50 Stat. 888 (1937) (codified at 
42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-36 (1964))) [hereinafter Comment, The Public Housing Administration]. 
48 Heyward v. Public Hous. Admin., 238 F.2d 689, 694-96 (5th Cir. 1956). 
49 Comment, The Public Housing Administration, supra note 47, at 871 n.1 (citing 61 Stat. 
954 (1947) (codified at 5 U.S.c. § 133) (1947))). 
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From 1937 to 1962 federal TSAP policy was one of "separate 
but equal."50 The Public Housing Administration authorized this 
policy of de jure segregation in its Low-Rent Housing Manual. 5l 
Although the Housing Act of 1949 called for integration of public 
housing as a goal of federal policy,52 there is no indication the Public 
Housing Administration ever issued regulations or took any action 
to further this statutory policy. On the contrary, its Low-Rent Hous-
ing Manual continued to authorize de jure segregation into the 
1950s.53 
President Kennedy in 1962 issued Executive Order 11,063 for-
bidding discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, or na-
tional origin in the sale or rental of residential property owned or 
operated by the federal government or with federal financial assis-
tance. 54 In interpreting the Executive Order, the government ex-
empted projects covered by existing contracts.55 The Public Housing 
Administration did not litigate a single case to enforce Executive 
Order 11,063. The agency ignored PHAs' widespread policy of 
siting new housing projects in racially identifiable neighborhoods 
and then assigning tenants to match the neighborhood racially. 
Apparently a formal disavowal of separate but equal satisfied the 
Public Housing Administration.56 Not surprisingly, there is no evi-
dence of any public housing desegregation before 1964.57 
50 Young v. Pierce, 628 F. Supp. 1037, 1045 (E.D. Tex. 1985), a/I'd, 822 F.2d 1368 (5th 
Cir. 1987); Flournoy & Rodrigue, Separate and Unequal, supra note 1, at 25A, col. 1. 
51 The Public Housing Administration Housing Manual, § 102.1, Feb. 21, 1951, stated: 
The following general statement of racial policy shall be applicable to all low-
rent housing projects developed and operated under the Housing Act of 1937, as 
amended. 
1. Programs for the development of low-rent housing in order to be eligible for 
[Public Housing Administration] assistance, must reflect equitable provision for eli-
gible families of all races determined on the approximate volume of their respective 
needs for such housing. 
Heyward, 238 F.2d at 697 (emphasis added). "Equitable provision" meant a separate but equal 
policy. /d. 
Guidelines such as this Housing Manual are presumed to be official federal policy "unless 
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the [authorizing] regulation." Arthur v. Starrett City 
Associates, 89 F.R.D. 542, 547 (D.C.N. Y. 1981) (letter from HUD's Executive Assistant to the 
Secretary represents official policy). 
52 42 U.S.c. § 1441 (1982). 
53 Heyward, 238 F.2d at 697. 
S4 3 C.F.R. 652 (1959-1963 Comp.), reprinted in 42 U.s.c. § 1982 (1982). 
'" Young v. Pierce, 628 F. Supp. 1037, 1045 (E.D. Tex. 1985), a/I'd, 822 F.2d 1368 (5th 
Cir. 1987). 
56 Comment, The Public Housing Administration, supra note 47, at 878-79. 
57 Young v. Pierce, 628 F. Supp. at 1045. 
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Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbade any federal 
funding of government programs that discriminated on the basis 
of race. In response to Title VI, the Public Housing Administration 
for the first time ordered PH As to submit TSAPs for federal ap-
provaf.58 At this same time, new federal regulations required PHAs 
to acknowledge their past intentional discrimination.59 The Public 
Housing Administration also encouraged PHAs to adopt "freedom 
of choice" TSAPs.6o Freedom of choice allowed applicants to choose 
a project or to list preferred projects upon application. The PHAs 
then kept separate waiting lists for each project.51 By incorporating 
freedom of choice in its Low-Rent Housing Handbook, successor 
to the Low-Rent Housing Manual, the Public Housing Administra-
tion in 1964 explicitly authorized applicant choice for the first 
time. 52 
Although apparently superseded in 1967 by new regulations, 
freedom of choice remained in HUD's Low-Rent Housing Hand-
book until 1969.63 This time lag demonstrated great bureaucratic 
inertia and/or the essential unity, in HUD's view, of the old and 
new regulations. In either case, Green v. County School Board,64 de-
cided in 1968, made the removal of freedom of choice inevitable. 
Green clearly indicated that, in the context of desegregation of public 
schools, the existence of more effective means of desegregation 
made freedom of choice policies unacceptable under the Constitu-
tion. 55 For example, the alternative means of desegregation in Green 
included redrawing school districts and consolidation of schools.56 
Federal housing officials could not have missed the implications of 
Green for their own desegregation policies. 
'8 Vann v. Housing Auth. of Kansas City, Mo., 87 F.R.D. 642, 655 (W.D. Mo. 1980). 
59 Comment, The Public Housing Administration, supra note 47, at 881-82. 
60 Id. The distribution of Form PHA-3037 containing these directives constituted the 
Public Housing Administration's only response to Title VI from 1964-1967. Young, 628 F. 
Supp. at 1045. 
61 Comment, The Public Housing Administratiun, supra note 47, at 881-82. Formal adoption 
of a freedom of choice policy met the Public Housing Administration's standards for com-
pliance with Title VI. Id. 
62 The Public Housing Administration knew much earlier of local policies allowing 
applicant choice. E.g., Heyward v. Public Hous. Admin., 238 F.2d 689, 692 (5th Cir. 1956). 
63 Many PH As continued to keep separate waiting lists for each project, characteristic of 
freedom of choice, with HUD approval. E.g., Compliance Agreement Between the U.s. Dep't 
of Hous. and Urban Dev. and the Boston H(lUs. Auth., Boston, Mass., Case No. 01-75-05-
015-3506-7 (Nov. 3, 1976). 
64 391 C' .S. 430. 
65 I d. at 439-41. 
66Id. at 442 n.6. 
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In recognition of the importance of federal housing policy, 
Congress created HUD in 1965.67 In 1967, HUD adopted its first 
TSAP regulations and guidelines and authorized a new form of 
applicant choice. In 24 C.F.R. § 1.4(b)(2)(ii), the agency required 
HUD approval of all local TSAPs and further mandated: 
A recipient [a PHA or a private development owner] ... shall 
assign eligible applicants to dwelling units ... on a community-
wide basis [i.e., using one waiting list] in sequence based upon 
the date and time the application is received, the size or type of 
unit suitable, and factors affecting preference or priority estab-
lished by the recipient's regulations, which are not inconsistent 
with the objectives of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
and this Part I. The plan may allow an applicant to refuse a tendered 
vacancy for good cause without losing his standing on the list but shall 
limit the number of refusals without cause as prescribed by the responsible 
Department official. 68 
With this new regulation, HUD reaffirmed the principle of appli-
cant choice without using the suspect description, freedom of 
choice. 
In July, 1967, HUD adopted guidelines authorizing two alter-
native TSAPs. Under "Plan A," a PHA could make one offer to 
each applicant when she reached the top of the waiting list; a refusal 
would place the applicant at the bottom of the list. Under "Plan B," 
the PHA would make one offer of a suitable vacancy from the 
project with the largest number of vacancies. If the applicant re-
fused, the PHA would offer a vacancy from the project with the 
second highest number of vacancies. If the applicant refused, the 
PHA would offer a vacancy from the development with the third 
highest number of vacancies. Upon a third refusal, the applicant 
would go to the bottom of the waiting list. To adopt another type 
ofTSAP, a PHA had to obtain HUD approva1.69 Although Congress 
knew of Plan B in 1967 when it began consideration of Title VIII,7° 
Congress at that time did not endorse this policy. Congress has 
never debated Plan B or any other type of applicant choice TSAP. 
In 1981, however, the Senate rejected Senator Orrin Hatch's at-
67 Comment, The Public Housing Administration, supra note 47, at 871 n.l (citing 79 Stat. 
667 (1965)). 
68 (38 F.R. 17,949. July 5, 1973, as amended at 50 F.R. 9269, Mar. 7, 1985) (emphasis 
added). 
69 Low RENT HOUSING HANDBOOK, supra note 23, at ch. 9, § 1, app. 2-3. 
70 See Hearings Before the Senate Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Affairs of the Committee 
on Banking Currency, on S. 1358, S. 2114, and S. 2280, Relating to Civil Rights and Housing, 
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 218, 237 (Aug. 21-23, 1967) [hereinafter Title VIII Hearings]. 
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tempt to weaken Title VIII with a law emphasizing free choice for 
citizens seeking public and private housing. 7l 
HUD officials in 1969 realized that the agency's TSAP policy 
had failed to produce any desegregated public housing.72 The De-
partment of Justice found in 1970 that "most public housing ... 
(projects) were segregated and the tenant assignment and selection 
policy could be a contributing factor. "73 In 1972 the HUD General 
Counsel wrote that the TSAP policy is "difficult to enforce and of 
dubious value."74 In 1977 a Department of Justice Civil Rights 
Division Interagency Survey found HUD's existing TSAP to be 
ineffective and recommended adoption of a new one "at the earliest 
opportunity."75 HUD and the Department of Justice signed a mem-
orandum of understanding in 1979 that HUD would take this step. 
Although HUD later improved other regulations to make them 
more effective,76 HUD never honored the 1979 memorandum of 
understanding. 77 Plan B is still official HUD policy.78 HUD contin-
ues to offer segregation remedies that rely on individual choice.79 
C. The Non-Litigation of Applicant Choice and Causation of Public 
Housing Segregation 
One reason for the persistence of choice TSAP regulations and 
guidelines is the failure of civil rights plaintiffs to litigate choice 
policies thoroughly. No desegregation case has directly challenged 
the authorization of applicant choice in 24 C.F.R. § 1.4(b)(2)(ii) 
71 Sen. Hatch's "Equal Access to Housing Act" disallowed any attempt to ensure a 
percentage of racial occupancy "except by free housing choice." S. 1670, 97th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 127 CONGo REC. S10,578 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1981); J. KUSHNER, FAIR HOUSING: DIS-
CRIMINATION IN REAL ESTATE, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND REVITALIZATION 663 (1983), 
438 (1987 Cum. Supp.) [hereinafter KUSHNER, FAIR HOUSING]. 
72 Young v. Pierce, 628 F. Supp. 1037, 1045-46 (E.D. Tex. 1985), afl'd, 822 F.2d 1368 
(5th Cir. 1987) (citing Federal Programs Section, Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't. of Justice, 
Interagency Survey Report Evaluation of Title VI Enforcement at the U.S. Dep't of Hous. 
& Urban Dev. (Sept. 1977)). 
73 Flournoy & Rodrigue, Fair Housing Failure, supra note 4, at 16A, col. 1. 
74 Young, 628 F. Supp. at 1046. 
75 Flournoy & Rodrigue, Fair Housing Failure, supra note 4, at 16A, col. 1. 
76 For example, in 1972 HUD issued regulations under Title VIII to restrict the siting 
of projects in minority communities and to require affirmative marketing of all federally 
subsidized units. 24 C.F.R. §§ 200.600-40; Young, 628 F. Supp. at 1046. 
77 Young V. Pierce, 628 F. Supp. 1037, 1047 (E.D. Tex. 1985); Flournoy & Rodrigue, 
Fair Housing Failure, supra note 4, at 16A. 
78 Telephone interview with Joe Vera, Chief, Fair Housing Enforcement Branch, Fair 
Housing Equal Opportunity Office, Region I (New England), HUD (Oct. 18, 1989). 
79 See, e.g., HUD, justice Dep't Charges Georgia, Arkansas PHA's with Discrimination, 7 HollS. 
& Dev. Rep. (BNA) 422 (1979). 
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(1985). In a dozen cases challenging choice TSAPs, the courts di-
vided. Neither the pro nor anti-choice line of decisions fully ex-
plored the possible causal connection between individual choice and 
segregation.80 
Only one case presented conclusive proof that applicant choice 
caused segregation. In Middleboro Housing Authority v. Kentucky Com-
mission on Civil Rights,Sl a small city with a Plan B TSAP had three 
white projects and two African-American projects.82 The Kentucky 
Appeals Court found that this system "guaranteed" segregation 
because the white applicants knew that one of the three offers under 
Plan B would be for a white project. The white applicants refused 
all offers of vacancies in African-American projects.83 This fact 
pattern is unusual, the key being that fewer than three projects 
were identifiable as minority. Accordingly, Middleboro, despite its 
strong anti-choice holding, would probably not apply to most PH As' 
choice TSAPs. 
The remaining anti-choice cases failed to present clear-cut and 
convincing evidence justifying a conclusive holding that applicant 
choice actually caused segregation. Some courts have found that 
applicant choice directly caused segregation but the lack of persua-
sive analysis weakened this finding, suggesting that other factors 
were the actual cause. This occurred in Resident Advisory Board v. 
Rizzo,84 where the lower court asserted that the applicant choice 
TSAP in Philadelphia's housing system logically must have caused 
system-wide segregation. This failed to convince the Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals, which voided the remedial TSAP.85 In Young v. 
Pierce,86 by contrast, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the 
lower court's inference of a substantial causal connection between 
applicant choice and segregation without proof of "but for" causa-
'0 The meager commentary on applicant choice and TSAP regulations is often similarly 
wanting in its analysis. For example, one article asserts that a 1970 case "compelled" HUD 
to promulgate "comprehensive Project Selection Criteria and tenant selection procedures," 
citing the 1973 publication of 24 C.F.R. § 1.4(b)(2)(ii). Comment, Discrimination in Public 
Housing: Rights and Remedies, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 582, 592 (1974) [hereinafter Comment, 
Discrimination in Public Housing]. The 1973 version, however, is identical to the 1969 regula-
tion, and HUD after 1967 never adopted any new TSAP procedures, "comprehensive" or 
otherwise. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text. 
81 553 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977). 
82 Id. at 59. 
83 Id. at 59-60, 63. 
84 425 F. Supp. 987 (E.D. Pa. 1976), afl'd in part, rev'd in part, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978). 
8; 564 F.2d at 152. 
86 628 F. Supp. 1037 (E.D. Tex. 1985), afl'd, 822 F.2d 1368 (5th Cir. 1987). 
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tion, i.e., evidence that applicant choice alone would cause segre-
gation.87 In Young, four of twenty-two PHAs in East Texas admin-
istered freedom of choice TSAPs. All twenty-two PHAs violated 
formal TSAP procedures.88 In contrast with Rizzo's bare record, 
extensive evidence in Young showed that HUD knew of the wide-
spread practice of skipping over minority applicants and assigning 
apartments to whites lower down on the waiting list (skipping). The 
plaintiffs in Young also showed that HUD's regulations required it 
to authorize and supervise all PHA activities relating to fair housing, 
including all TSAP policies and practices. HUD was thus liable for 
all the possible causes. 89 Accordingly, the U.S. District Court for 
Eastern Texas found that applicant choice was a substantial cause 
of segregation, although there was no evidence that it alone had 
caused segregation.90 
Application of a causation standard of substantial cause was 
critical to the plaintiffs' victory in Young. Tort law defines substantial 
cause as one contributing to an event and not superseded by sub-
sequent causes.9J A substantial cause does not rise to the level of a 
necessary element, an element "but for" which the event would not 
have occurred. 92 A substantial cause is rather a partial cause, one 
of several major contributing factors to an event.93 Thus, in the 
absence of one substantial cause, other factors could produce the 
same event. A defendant nonetheless could still be liable based on 
the contribution of that one substantial cause factor. 94 For example, 
in Young v. Pierce, HUD's regulatory duties to approve and supervise 
the acts of PHAs provided such a sufficient connection. HUD's 
approval of choice TSAPs was a substantial cause of segregation 
across thirty-six counties in East Texas, despite the PHAs' skipping 
practices and widespread violations of the formal TSAPs.9S 
87 628 F. Supp. at 1046, 1051-56,822 F.2d at 1372. 
's 628 F. Supp. at 1048-51; cj. Jaimes v. Toledo Metro. H(ms. Auth., 758 F.2d 1086, 
1106, 1108 (6th Cir. 1985) (district court did "no analysis" of the causal relation of Plan B 
to segregation, but nonetheless Plan B contributed "at least in part"), afl'd in part, rev'd in 
part, 833 F.2d 1203, 1208 (6th Cir. 1987) (HUD liable under Title VI, Title VIII, and equal 
protection clause if "on notice" of PHA's discriminatory practices). 
89 544 F. Supp. 1010, 1015 (E.D. Tex. 1982), ail"d, 822 F.2d 1368 (5th Cir. 1987). 
90 628 F. Supp. at 1046, 1051-56,640 F. Supp. at 1482-83,822 F.2d at 1372. 
9] See, e.g., Hamil v. Bushline, 481 Pa. 256, 266, 270, 272 n.9, 392 A.2d 1280, 1285, 
1287-88 n.9 (1978). 
92 See, e.g., Cole v. Shell Petroleum Co., 149 Kan. 25, 37, 86 P.2d 740, 747-48 (1939). 
93 See, e.g., Hamil, 481 Pa. at 266, 392 A.2d at 1285. 
94 See, e.g., Kingston v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway, 191 Wis. 610, ,211 N.W. 913, 
914 (1927). 
Y5 628 F. Supp. 1037, 1045-46, 1051-54 (E.D. Tex. 1985), afl'd, 822 F.2d 1368, 1372 
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Despite the extensive record and sweeping victory for plaintiffs 
in Young, the lack of proof that applicant choice alone would cause 
segregation undercuts the persuasive force of this case. Plaintiffs in 
other cases may have to make such a showing, because they cannot 
support inferences of causation with a Young fact pattern, i.e., many 
years of HUD's knowing acquiescence in a variety of discriminatory 
local policies.96 Also, courts looking for "but for" causation will have 
a ready-made hook on which to hang their dismissals. 
The pro-choice line of decisions similarly begs a number of 
questions. In Vann v. Housing Authority of Kansas City, Missouri,97 the 
U.S. District Court for Western Missouri dismissed plaintiffs' chal-
lenge of applicant choice on standing grounds, ignoring extensive 
factual material supporting the cause of action.98 In another Eighth 
Circuit case, Jenkins v. State of Missouri,99 HUD won a dismissal on 
questionable legal grounds. Specifically, the U.S. District Court for 
Western Missouri found that HUD had no duty to enforce its non-
discrimination regulations, despite substantial evidence and legal 
authority for such a duty.IOO Thus, in two major victories for HUD, 
Eighth Circuit courts never reached the merits of the choice TSAP 
causation claim. 
Courts have upheld choice TSAPs in cases where plaintiffs did 
not actually challenge applicant choice. For example, in Perez v. 
Boston Housing Authority,IOI a tenants' class action suit concerning 
substandard living conditions, the trial judge raised the issue of 
segregation on his own motion. 102 Although endorsing the Boston 
Housing Authority's desegregation preference TSAP, the Massa-
(5th Cir. 1987) (HUD tried separately from other defendants); see also Jaimes v. Toledo 
Metro. Hous. Auth., 758 F.2d 1086 (6th Cir. 1985), afl'd in part, rev'd in part, 833 F.2d 1203 
(6th Cir. 1987); cf United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 467 F.2d 848, 863-64 (5th Cir. 
1972), afl'd on remand, 564 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 915 (1979) (state 
policies contributed to residential segregation by either causing additional segregation or 
maintaining existing segregation). 
96 628 F. Supp. at 1051. 
97 87 F.R.D. 642 (W.D. Mo. 1980). 
98 [d. at 649-51; see also Bell v. Board of Educ., Akron Pub. Schools, 491 F. Supp. 916, 
945-48 (N.D. Ohio), afl'd, 683 F.2d 963 (6th Cir. 1982). 
99 593 F. Supp. 1485 (W.D. Mo. 1984), overruled on other issues sub nom. Jenkins by Agyei 
v. Missouri, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986) (en bane). 
100 807 F.2d at 692 n.l0 (Arnold, J., dissenting). 
101 379 Mass. 703,400 N.E.2d 1231 (1980). 
102 M. McCreight, Recent History of Fair Housing Issues at the Boston Housing Authority 
2 (Mar. 3, 1980) (memorandum from Greater Boston Legal Services attorney to Boston 
Housing Authority tenant organizations) (available from author). 
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chusetts trial and appellate courts never litigated the legality of 
applicant choice. lo3 
Finally, some courts have held that applicant choice is actually 
remedial, but have offered no evidence or analysis of why this is 
SO.I04 These cases suggested that where PHAs consistently failed to 
adhere to the formal policy of applicant choice and instead practiced 
skipping and other illegal practices, applicant choice deserved a 
chance to work. !Os This reasoning implies that HUD approval of 
choice TSAPs presumptively demonstrates their effectiveness in 
desegregating public housing. The regulatory history of applicant 
choice clearly indicates that this rationale is wrong. 
In a third set of cases challenging choice TSAPs, courts issued 
contradictory holdings. In the earliest case in which plaintiffs chal-
lenged applicant choice, Heyward v. Public Housing Administration,106 
plaintiffs objected to a federal requirement that applicants state a 
preference for a specific housing project. The Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals agreed with plaintiffs that because all the projects were 
segregated, applicants had to make a racial choice in violation of 
the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. I07 Although rec-
ognizing a valid cause of action against this freedom of choice TSAP, 
the Fifth Circuit declined to reach a decision on the challenge. 
Instead the court granted dismissal on standing, since plaintiffs 
were not tenants or applicants. lOB Heyward could support the prop-
osition that requiring applicants to choose among racially classified 
projects is impermissible. This is very different from a finding that 
applicant choice created those classifications in the first place. 
103 Schmidt v. Boston Hous. Auth., 505 F. Supp. 988, 995, 997 (D. Mass. 1981) (white 
plaintiffs unsuccessfully challenged desegregation preference TSAP endorsed by Perez but 
did not oppose applicant choice). 
104 Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. 1485, 1498-99 (W.D. Mo. 1984), overruled on other 
issues sub nom. Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 807 F.2d 657, 692 (8th Cir. 1986) (en banc) 
(housing decisions upheld on 4-4 vote); Blackshear Residents Org. V. Housing Auth. of 
Austin, 347 F. Supp. 1138, 1144-45 (W.D. Tex. 1972); accord Pennsylvania Human Relations 
Comm'n V. Chester HollS. Auth., 458 Pa. 67, 85-86, 327 A.2d 335, 344-45 (1974), cert. 
denied, 420 U.S. 974 (1975) (defendant PHA unsuccessfully pleaded compliance with Plan B 
as a defense to skipping practices, and court implied that actual compliance would be a good 
defense). 
105 See, e.g., Jenkins, 593 F. Supp. at 1498-99; United States V. Greater Gadsden Hous. 
Auth., 1 Equal Opp'y Hous. (P-H) ~ 13,591, 13,900, 13,903 (N.D. Ala., No. 69-36, Mar. 23, 
1973). 
106 238 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1956). 
107 /d. at 696-97. 
108 [d. at 698. 
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Some courts have held for plaintiffs but on grounds other than 
plaintiffs' challenge of a choice TSAP. For example, Pennsylvania 
Human Relations Commission v. Chester Housing Authority!09 did not 
reach the issue of the choice TSAP's causation of segregation. In-
stead, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the PHA caused 
segregation by the practice of skipping. llo The court did not ex-
amine or decide the actual effect of applicant choice on occupancy 
patterns. 
III. PLAINTIFFS' THEORIES OF CAUSATION 
Ultimately Heyward and Chester have a great deal in common 
with the more explicitly pro and anti-choice cases. None of these 
cases explained the actual causal relationship of choice to segrega-
tion. A judicial determination of this causal relationship, however, 
is quite possible. Title VI and Title VIII set out a standard of 
causation which plaintiffs could meet by establishing an inference 
of substantial causation. 
A. The Standard of Causation Under Title VI 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides: "No person 
in the United States shall on the ground of race, color, or national 
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, 
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity 
receiving federal assistance."!!! The Supreme Court has recognized 
an implied private right of action under Title VI.ll2 In bringing 
such a cause of action against HUD, the plaintiffs must prove that 
HUD is involved in a federally subsidized activity, that HUD's ac-
tions actually caused discrimination, and that HUD intended to 
discriminate. ll3 Thus, plaintiffs must prove causation by showing 
that HUD's authorization of applicant choice TSAPs was a federally 
subsidized activity and that applicant choice caused segregation. 
109 458 Pa. 67, 327 A.2d 335 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 974 (1975). 
110 [d. at 70, 327 A.2d at 337. 
III 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982). 
1I2 Guardians' Ass'n v. Civil Servo Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 593-95 (1983) (5-4 vote on 
this issue); 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-2 (1982); 110 CONGo REc. 5256 (1964) (statements of Sens. 
Case and Humphrey emphasizing that the limitations on defunding do not in any way limit 
the rights of "individuals"). But see 110 CONGo REc. 2467 (1964) (statement of Rep. Gill); 110 
CONGo REc. 6562 (1964) (statement of Sen. Kuchel). 
1I3 E.g., Resident Advisory Bd. V. Rizzo, 425 F. Supp. 987, 1024 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd in 
part, rev'd in part, 564 F.2d 126, 140 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978). 
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The words "any program or activity receiving federal assis-
tance" refer not only to PH As' activity of providing public housing 
but also to HUD's actions in funding and regulating PHAs.114 Ac-
cordingly, courts have held that HUD regulations are within the 
scope of Title VI, and are willing to override HUD procedures 
when they are clearly inadequate. I IS Thus, plaintiffs can meet the 
first element of a Title VI cause of action against HUD, since HUD's 
TSAP regulations clearly involve a federally subsidized activity. 
Actual causation of segregation is the second element of a Title 
VI cause of action. As a threshold question, plaintiffs must show 
that the discriminatory effect that Title VI forbids could include 
public housing segregation. Title VI's legislative history,116 HUD's 
regulations,117 and the case law l18 indicate that "subjected to dis-
crimination" includes federally supported public housing segrega-
tion. 1l9 
114 Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal 
financial assistance to any program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or contract 
other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized and directed to effectuate 
the provisions of section 2000d of this title with respect to such program or activity 
by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be consistent 
with achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance 
in connection with which the action is taken. 
42 U.S.C. 2000d-1 (1982) (emphasis added). 
115 Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 139-40; Young v. Pierce, 628 F. Supp. 1037, 1058-59 (E.D. Tex. 
1985), a/I'd, 822 F.2d 1368 (5th Cir. 1987); Blackshear Residents Org. V. Housing Auth. of 
Austin, 347 F. Supp. 1138, 1147 (W.D. Tex. 1972). 
116 Title VI prohibits "racial discrimination or segregation ... in connection with" 
federally assisted programs. 110 CONGo REC. 1527 (1964) (statement of Rep. Celler, sponsor 
of Civil Rights Act of 1964); University of Cal. Regents V. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,285 n.20 
(Powell, j.), 330-38 (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., concurring) (1977); Led-
better, Public Housing - A Social Experiment Seeks Acceptance, 32 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS 490, 
503 (1967). 
11724 C.F.R. § 1.4(b)(1) (1985) states that no recipient of federal aid may on the basis of 
race: 
(i) Deny a person any housing, accommodations, facilities, services, financial aid 
or other benefits ... ; 
(ii) Provide any housing, accommodations, facilities, services, financial aid or 
other benefits to a person which are different, or are provided in a different manner 
from those provided to others under the program ... ; 
(iii) Subject a person to segregation or separate treatment in any manner related 
to his receipt of housing, accommodations, facilities, services, financial aid or other 
benefits under the program or activity; 
(iv) Restrict a person in any way in access to such housing ... benefits .... 
118 E.g., Gautreaux V. Chicago Hous. Auth., 265 F. Supp. 582, 583 (N.D. Ill. 1967), a/I'd, 
296 F. Supp. 907 (E.D. Ill. 1969), a/I'd sub nom. Hills V. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976). 
119 Title VI regulations also cover privately owned federally subsidized housing. When 
a PHA channels federal funds to private owners under the Section 8 program, it must submit 
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Turning to the basic question of cause and effect, the plaintiffs 
must show by a "preponderance of the evidence"12o that applicant 
choice causes segregation. It is easy to prove the existence of seg-
regation; in fact HUD concedes this.l2l It is more difficult to prove 
that HUD-authorized choice TSAPs cause this segregation. The 
basic principles of causation elaborated in school and housing de-
segregation cases provide a starting point. 122 These well-established 
principles justify the Fifth and Sixth Circuits' use of a substantial 
cause standard. 
Inferences of causation would be unnecessary if direct evidence 
were available, as in Brown v. Board of Education. 123 In Brown, the 
defendant school board admitted that it caused the school system 
to be segregated by race. 124 Hence, plaintiffs had no problem of 
apportioning liability among multiple defendants nor a problem of 
determining which of several factors associated with one defendant 
were the actual cause or causes. 125 Clearly, but for the actions of the 
Topeka Board of Education, school segregation would not have 
occurred. A substantial cause standard, therefore, was unnecessary. 
equal opportunity housing plans. 24 C.F.R. § 882.204(b)(1) (1985). Under the Section 8 
program of new construction or substantial rehabilitation, the developer must submit a 
nondiscriminatory TSAP. 24 C.F.R. §§ l.4(a)-(b) (1985). Under the rent supplement program, 
the PHA must submit an equal opportunity housing plan to HUD. See Young v. Pierce, 544 
F. Supp. 1010, 1027-28 (E.D. Tex. 1982), aff'd, 685 F. Supp. 975, 978-79 (E.D. Tex. 1988). 
HUD's duties of regulation and enforcement are the same for governmental and private 
recipients of funds. Williamsburg Fair HOllS. Comm. v. New York City Hous. Auth., 73 
F.R.D. 381, 383 (S.D.N.V. 1976), aff'd, 493 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D.N.V. 1980). 
120 S. Tucker, Memorandum on Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Service Delivery 
5 (June 1980) (communication of Title VI compliance review policies from Assistant Director, 
HUD Fair Housing Equal Opportunity Office (FHEO), to all FHEO Regional Directors, 
Compliance Division Directors and Area Office Directors) [hereinafter Tucker, Memorandum 
on Nondiscrimination]. 
121 See Flournoy & Rodrigue, Separate and Unequal, supra note 1, at 24A; Comment, The 
Public Housing Administration, supra note 47, at 871 n.4. 
122 The standard of causation under the equal protection clause, commonly used in 
desegregation cases, is identical to that required by Title VI. University of Calif. Regents v. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287 (Powell, ].), 328 (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, J]', 
concurring) (1977). 
123 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
124 [d. at 486 n.l. 
125 Actually there were two defendants in Brown, the state of Kansas and the Topeka 
school board. On the question of de jure segregation, the two were effectively one defendant, 
as liability turned on the constitutionality of a state law and the school board was simply an 
extension of the state implementing this law. If the Court had upheld de jure segregation, 
the school board alone could have been liable on the separate issue of providing unequal 
education. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797, 797-98 (D. Kan. 1951). 
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In the modern context of public housing segregation, problems 
of multiple defendants and multiple causes exist. 126 The typical 
public housing case involves numerous defendants: a PHA, HUD, 
local elected officials such as mayors, and agencies such as school 
boards or development planning boards. Even if the plaintiffs sue 
only one defendant, this defendant can argue that other parties' 
acts were the actual causes of segregation. Plaintiffs usually cannot 
show that but for one defendant's acts, no segregation would have 
occurred. The possible multiple causes further complicate the pic-
ture: HUD authorization of applicant choice, HUD approvals of 
project siting, PHA adoption of applicant choice, PHA deviations 
from the official TSAP, PHA decisions on project siting, and the 
local school boards' creation of racially identifiable schools which 
helps determine the racial identity of adjacent neighborhoods and 
housing projects. Plaintiffs typically cannot show that but for one 
causal factor, no segregation would have occurred. Desegregation 
cases have accordingly drawn on tort law solutions to cases involving 
multiple defendants and multiple cause fact patterns. Following are 
two theories derived from desegregation law which could support 
a finding of inferred causation against HUD. 
1. Inferences of Substantial Cause 
An inferred cause theory must first show that among multiple 
defendants, HUD's acts constitute a substantial cause. Certain fac-
tors could warrant an inference of substantial cause. Statistical evi-
dence of a strong association between segregation and a defendant's 
policies, although not conclusive, could help justify such an infer-
ence. 127 The existence of a segregated national system of public 
housing probably constitutes such a statistical association. Rarely 
will a statistical association by itself prove causation, absent proof of 
some causal mechanism. 128 
126 See generally Days, School Desegregation Law, supra note 44. 
127 Any "statistical evidence of disparate effect of a rule or a practice on a protected 
minority is highly probative." KUSHNER, FAIR HOUSING, supra note 71, at 75. Such evidence 
might include the total' absence of minorities from a housing project, significant underre-
presentation of minorities at a project, and expert testimony on the effects of a policy or 
practice. [d. at 75-77. 
128 Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Antonio, _U.S. _, _, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2121 
(1989) (in Title VII employment discrimination case, specific causal practice must be iden-
tified); see also KUSHNER, FAIR HOUSING, supra note 71, at 76. 
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For example, HUD's standards of causation under Title VI 
require in addition to a disparate impact a showing that "such 
disparity was brought about through some action or inaction."129 
Under its own policies, HUD's inaction could be a cause of segre-
gation through a failure "to seek out and document the cause of 
the disparity."13o HUD's Title VI policies thus suggest that failure 
to cure the segregation resulting from its actions or inactions would 
make HUD strictly liable. These policies find a prima facie case of 
causation where any "exclusionary effect" exists, where services to 
a protected class are not "qualitatively equivalent" to services to 
whites, or where a defendant has not taken "affirmative steps" to 
"overcome the effects of discrimination."131 
In Young v. Pierce, for example, once PHAs caused segregation 
by illegally assigning applicants to apartments on the basis of race 
and once HUD knew of the resulting racial disparity, HUD had a 
duty to seek out the causes of segregation and remedy them. HUD's 
failure to do so in Young became a major factor in maintaining 
segregation in the East Texas PHAs. This liability for inaction arises, 
however, only when a prior cause of segregation exists and is known 
to HUD. In Young, this was the PHAs' discrimination over many 
years. 
In order to justify what is essentially a vicarious liability, courts 
have used equitable principles. For example, if evidence suggests 
that two or more defendants acted in concert, courts are more likely 
to find each defendant to be a substantial cause of an event. Logi-
cally, under tort law, whether defendants acted separately or to-
gether should be irrelevant to causation. 132 In desegregation cases, 
however, the Supreme Court seems to apply narrower equitable 
principles out of fairness to defendants. 
The Court distinguishes joint action and independent action, 
in the latter situation requiring "but for" causation for each act. For 
example, the U.S. District Court for Eastern Michigan in Milliken v. 
Bradley 133 applied the standard modern tort law approach. This 
court found that suburban school districts' encouragement of white 
flight was a cause of school segregation in Detroit. Specifically, the 
court found that the suburban school districts' massive construction 
129 Tucker, Memorandum on Nondiscrimination, supra note 120, at 4-5. 
130Id. at 4. 
131 Id. at 4 n.l. 
132 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 875, 879 (1977). 
133 345 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Mich. 1972), aff'd, 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 418 
U.S. 717 (1974). 
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programs of schools for all-white student bodies was a substantial 
cause by inviting, planning for, and inducing white flight. 134 The 
Supreme Court, however, ruled that the Detroit defendants' acts 
had no "segregative effect" in the suburban districts and therefore 
that the suburban actors did not cause the white flight. 135 This 
finding, apparently contrary to the facts,136 suggests that parties 
acting relatively independently of a primary defendant are less 
likely to be found a cause of segregation because a "but for" stan-
dard will apply. The Court's deference to government defendants 
in desegregation cases acting independently of a primary defen-
dant, however, will not aid HUD. Since HUD and PHAs act in 
concert by regulatory mandate, 137 the Supreme Court is more likely 
to apply a substantial cause standard to HUD's acts. 
Another equitable principle justifying a substantial cause find-
ing against HUD is the proposition that, relative to innocent plain-
tiffs, fairness dictates that defendants should have the burden of 
proving another cause superseded and negated the defendants' 
acts.13S This fairness rationale saved a weak causation argument in 
Jaimes v. Toledo Metropolitan Housing Authority, 139 where HUD and a 
PHA were defendants. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found 
that the U.S. District Court for Northern Ohio did "no analysis" of 
whether Plan B was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs' injuries. 
The trial court failed to establish "but for" causation, i.e., whether 
any alternative policy could have avoided the injury.14o Nonetheless, 
the Sixth Circuit found that where the racial imbalance was "attri-
butable, at least in part to past practices of segregation ... those 
responsible for tenant assignment and transfers may properly be 
ordered" to abandon Plan B and implement a special affirmative 
action TSAP.141 Thus, establishment of a substantial cause standard 
on equitable grounds may be crucial. 
Once the plaintiffs establish that HUD's acts constitute a sub-
stantial cause of segregation, the court must decide whether it is 
"" DIMOND, BEYOND BUSING, supm note 38, at 81-83. The author was an attorney for 
the plaintiffs in this case. 
135 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974). 
136 DIMOND, BEYOND BUSING, supm note 38, at 81-83. 
137 E.g., 24 C.F.R. § 1.4(b)(2)(ii) (1985). 
138 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 
n.21 (1977); Days, Schoul Desegregation Law, sujJm note 44, at 1750-51 (citing KEETON & 
PROSSER, TORTS § 41 at 265-68 (1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B) (1977)). 
139 758 F.2d 1086 (6th Cir. 1985), aiI'd in part, rev'd in part, 833 F.2d 1203 (6th Cir. 1987). 
HII 758 F.2d at 1106. 
HI [d. at 1108. 
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necessary to identify which of these acts are the actual cause or 
causes. The Fifth and Sixth Circuits' anti-choice line of decisions 
suggests that the plaintiffs do not have to identify the actual mech-
anisms of segregation. For example, in Young v. Pierce142 the trial 
court found HUD liable for TSAP-caused segregation where alter-
native causes existed. The alternatives included authorization of 
TSAPs in thirty-six counties in East Texas and failure to ensure 
PHA compliance with the formal TSAPs. Only four of these TSAPs 
involved applicant choice. 143 The existence of a direct causal link 
between HUD and the PHAs based on HUD's regulatory duties 
justified the inference of causation against HUD without assigning 
each cause to a discrete increment of segregation. 
Inferring substantial cause without identifying the mechanisms 
of causation departs significantly from earlier tort law, under which 
plaintiffs must attribute a specific wrongful act to each defendant. 
The modern trend of tort law allows an inference of substantial 
cause against one defendant even where it is impossible to tie each 
defendant to one of the possible causal acts.144 The Fifth and Sixth 
Circuits appeared to adopt this standard of broad liability for mul-
tiple defendants with multiple causes in their anti-choice cases. The 
Eighth Circuit apparently adopted a standard of "but for" causation 
based on more traditional tort law principles, requiring some proof 
of specific causal mechanisms in the housing segregation area. 
Even the Sixth Circuit, in Jaimes, 145 insisted on evidence that 
the injury was "fairly traceable" to the defendant. 146 In addition, 
Jaimes required plaintiffs to show that any proposed remedy would 
cure the injuries. 147 Only an explanation of the actual dynamics of 
segregation through applicant choice would provide a "traceable" 
connection. Only such an explanation would clarify what type of 
remedy would be effective, i.e., a TSAP which does not rely on 
individual choice to achieve desegregation. Despite advancing a 
fairly tough standard of causation for plaintiffs to meet, the Sixth 
Circuit inJaimes did not reverse the lower court's decision, although 
it stated that the plaintiffs failed to meet this standard. 148 This 
contradictory decision probably resulted from a reluctance to over-
142 628 F. Supp. 1037 (E.D. Tex. 1988). 
143 Id. at 1048-50. 
144 See, e.g., Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 492, 154 P.2d 687, 690 (1944). 
145 758 F.2d 1086. 
146 Id. at 1093. 
147 Id. 
148Id. at 1106, 1108. 
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turn the trial court's finding of fact when there was a bare factual 
basis to support an inference that Plan B was a partial cause. 
2. A Presumption of Causation 
A second theory allows for a presumption of causation through-
out a system of government-supported activity once plaintiffs show 
a defendant caused segregation in one part of the system. The 
rationale for such an inference is that Brown v. Board of Education!49 
in 1954 imposed an ongoing affirmative duty on all levels of gov-
ernment to eradicate segregated public facilities.!50 For example, 
when the minority plaintiffs in Dayton Board of Education v. 
Brinkman!5! proved causation of school segregation in one geo-
graphic area of the Dayton school system, a presumption arose of 
causation throughout the system, since the original duty extended 
across the system.!52 The defendant school board then had the 
burden of proof in showing intervening parties' acts prevented 
defendant from meeting this duty.!53 Applying this theory to HUD, 
if plaintiffs could show that applicant choice caused segregation of 
one project, a court could presume causation through the PHA's 
system, since the Brown-mandated duty extended across this system. 
By proving causation in one or more PHA systems, plaintiffs could 
expand this theory to support a presumption of causation across all 
federally supported public housing programs. 
To summarize, it is consistent with modern tort principles to 
find that HUD's authorization of choice TSAPs and its violation of 
regulatory duties to supervise the actions of PHAs constitute a 
substantial cause of segregation. The Fifth and Sixth Circuits' the-
ories of causation under a Title VI analysis, following evolving tort 
law, do not require an explanation of the actual process of segre-
gation. This presents two problems. Plaintiffs cannot propose ef-
fective remedies if the causal mechanisms are poorly understood. 
Also, courts adopting the Eighth Circuit standard of "but for" cau-
sation will not accept evidence merely suggesting that a choice TSAP 
was a partial cause of segregation. Such courts will demand proof 
that "but for" applicant choice, segregation would not have oc-
149 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
150 Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman. 443 U.S. 526, 529, 537 (1979). 
151 [d. at 526. 
152 [d. at 535-38, 541. 
153 [d. at 537; see Days, School Desegregation Law, supra note 44, at 1750 (citing Columbus 
Bd. of Educ. v. Penick. 443 U.S. 449, 459 (1979». 
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curred. The special duties imposed on HUD by Title VIII and an 
analysis of the social forces shaping applicant choice could help 
plaintiffs satisfy this more demanding approach. 
B. The Standard of Causation Under Title VIII 
Title VI requires that HUD not fund any activity which dis-
criminates against racial minoritie:;. In interpreting this obligation, 
the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have held HUD to a duty to monitor 
HUD-authorized TSAPs and to replace TSAPs that produce seg-
regation. HUD's failure to replace applicant choice TSAPs arguably 
breaches this duty and causes segregation. Title VIII, known as the 
Fair Housing Act of 1968,154 codifies this court-created duty and 
places more demanding obligations on HUD.155 While passive su-
pervision of PHAs may not violate a Title VI duty, it clearly violates 
Title VIII's more affirmative obligations. Thus, Title VIII greatly 
aids plaintiffs in proving substantial cause or "but for" cause. 
Title VIII is more than an alternative cause of action to Title 
VI. Courts that have applied the two statutes together use only one 
standard of causation. The two are effectively pari materia regarding 
causation. 156 Thus, Title VIII is a "super-amendment" to Title VI. 
Title VIII's essential goal is to provide fair housing throughout 
the United States. 157 The legislative history indicates that Congress 
desired immediate results in achieving integrated patterns of hous-
ing. 15s Congress believed that actual integration was necessary to 
achieve the goals of aiding minorities trapped in ghettos and of 
educating whites insulated from any contact with minorities. 159 Con-
gress indicated that Title VIII was strong remedial legislation by 
154 Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81, codified at 42 
U.S.c. §§ 3601-3631 (1982). 
155 See, e.g., NAACP, Boston Chapter v. Secretary of HUD, 817 F.2d 149, 155 (1st Cir. 
1987); Clients' Council v. Pierce, 711 F.2d 1406, 1425 (8th Cir. 1983). 
156 See Jaimes v. Toledo Metro. Hous. Auth., 758 F.2d 1086, 1089, 1099, 1108 (6th Cir. 
1985), afl'd in part, rev'd in part, 833 F.2d 1203 (6th Cir. 1987); Clients' Council v. Pierce, 711 
F.2d at 1423, 1425; Young v. Pierce, 544 F. Supp. 1010, 1013, 1017 (E.D. Tex. 1982), afl'd, 
822 F.2d 1368 (5th Cir. 1987); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 127 (3d Cir. 
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978); Banks v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175, 1179 (N.D. Ohio 
1972), afl'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 473 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1972). 
157 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1982); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 
(1972) (Title VIII requires the replacement of ghettos with truly integrated living patterns). 
15" 114 CONGo REc. 2274-76 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale); NAACP, Boston Chap-
ter V. Secretary of HUD, 817 F.2d at 155; Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. V. Village of 
Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1289 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978); 
Resident Advisory Bd. V. Rizzo, 425 F. Supp. at 1015. 
159 114 CONGo REc. 2275-76 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale). 
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allowing recovery of damages (unlike Title VI),160 permitting liabil-
ity with no proof of intent,161 and mandating actual desegregation, 
not merely neutral processes. 162 Clearly, Congress considered "fair 
housing" to mean actual desegregation. 
Title VIII imposes a variety of obligations on HUD aimed at 
achieving actual integration. It requires HUD to investigate the 
effects of its programs,163 to monitor PHAs for the impact of local 
TSAPs and other policies, 164 to "administer ... affirmatively" these 
programs,165 and to know the workings of discrimination in local 
housing markets. 166 Along with these statutory provisions, the leg-
islative history supports judicial findings of a strict duty to end 
segregation. The two congressional authors of Title VIII specifically 
targeted HUD's maintenance of segregation in public housing as 
an object of this legislation. In Senator Edward Brooke's words, 
"Rarely does HUD withhold funds or defer action in the name of 
desegregation. In fact, if it were not for all the printed guidelines, 
one would scarcely know a Civil Rights Act [of 1964] had been 
passed."167 Senator Brooke continued: 
Today's Federal housing official commonly inveighs against the 
evils of ghetto life even as he pushes buttons that ratify their 
triumph - even as he ok's public housing in the heart of Negro 
slums, releases planning and urban renewal funds to cities dead-
set against integration and approves the financing of subdivi-
sions from which Negroes will be barred. These and similar acts 
are committed daily by officials who say they are unalterably 
opposed to segregation and have the memos to prove it. 
... But when you ask one of these gentlemen why despite 
the 1962 [Executive] Order [11,063] most public housing is still 
segregated, he invariably blames it on regional custom, local 
traditions, personal prejudices of municipal housing officials. 168 
IbO 42 U.S.c. § 3612(c) (1982). 
ltil See 114 Cor.;G. REC. 5216, 5221-22 (1968); Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of 
Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 934-35 (2d Cir. 1988), aff'd, U.S. , 109 S. Ct. 276 (1988). 
lti2 E.g., "It is time to adopt strategies for action that will produce quick and visible 
progress." 114 CONGo REC. 9559 (1968) (statement of Sen. Celler, Chair of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee and a sponsor of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
163 Exec. Order No. 12,259, § 1-301(b)(1) (1980), 3 C.F.R. 308 (1981), reprinted in 42 
U.S.C. § 3608 (1982), requires the Secretary of HUD to "describe an institutionalized method 
for analyzing the impact of housing and urban development and activities in promoting the 
goal of fair housing." 
Ib4 E.g., Young V. Pierce, 628 F. Supp. at 1054-55. 
165 42 U.S.c. § 3608(e)(5) (1982) requires the Secretary of HUD to administer HUD 
programs and activities "in a manner affirmatively to further the policies of this subchapter." 
Ib6 42 U .S.C. § 3609 (1982). 
167 114 CONGo REC. 2527-28 (1968). 
itiS [d. at 2281. 
148 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 10:121 
In the words of Senator Walter Mondale, "The record of the U.S. 
government in that [post-World War II] period is one, at best, of 
covert collaborator in policies which established the present outra-
geous and heartbreaking racial living patterns which lie at the core 
of the tragedy of the American city .... "169 
Courts have not clearly established whether Title VIII requires 
a substantial cause or "but for" proof of causation. Most courts have 
accepted inferences of substantial cause where such policies "tend 
to perpetuate" segregation along with other causal factors. 17o This 
is consistent with the broad interpretation due all major statements 
of national fair housing policy.l7l Applying the Title VIII concep-
tion of fair housing to HUD, Third and Sixth Circuit courts have 
found a strict duty that HUD not take regulatory actions which 
maintain segregation. 172 Some courts have applied a more lenient 
"but for" standard,173 implying a greater readiness to find interven-
ing factors which could supersede HUD's authorization of applicant 
choice. Thus, as under Title VI, ajudge's choice of "but for" versus 
"substantial cause" could be decisive. 
Due to the wide-ranging obligations imposed on HUD by Title 
VIII, however, the plaintiffs could more easily satisfy a "but for" 
standard. The Title VIII mandate to administer affirmatively would 
greatly strengthen an argument that HUD's ongoing failures to 
remedy public housing segregation breach a duty and are thus "but 
for" factors. If HUD had met this strict duty to cure segregation, 
then segregation might not exist today. 174 Perhaps in reaction to the 
strictness of this standard, one court has found the duty to admin-
169Id. at 2278. Congress later reemphasized Title VIII's coverage of HUD by placing all 
federal exercise of regulatory authority related to housing in the scope of Title VIII. Exec. 
Order No. 12,259, § 1-101 (1980),3 C.F.R. 308 (1981), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 3608 (1982). 
170 Middleboro Hous. Auth. v. Kentucky Comm'n on Civil Rights, 553 S.W.2d 57, 62 
(Ky. App. 1977); see also NAACP, Boston Chapter v. Secretary of HUD, 817 F.2d 149, 151, 
154 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. City of Parma, Ohio, 494 F. Supp. 1049, 1055 (1980), 
a/I'd in part, rev'd in part, 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 926 (1982). 
171 Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972); United States v. 
Parma, 494 F. Supp. at 1053. 
172 Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 425 F. Supp. 987, 1021 (E.D. Pa. 1976), a/I'd in part, 
rev'd in part, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978) (failure to end a 
policy which prevents fair housing violates Title VIII); United States v. Parma, 494 F. Supp. 
at 1095 ("The existence of a discriminatory policy, statute or ordinance is itself a discrimi-
natory pattern or practice"). 
173 See Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 
1294-96 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978). 
174 See, e.g., NAACP, Boston Chapter v. Kemp, No. 78-850-S, slip op. at 2, 5-7,10-11 
(D. Mass. June 23, 1989) (HUD liable for failure over ten years to alter patterns of segregated 
housing in Boston by placing effective conditions on grants of money). 
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ister affirmatively to be so general as to be meaningless. 175 The 
legislative history, however, in particular Senators Brooke and Mon-
dale's floor remarks, supports a plain meaning interpretation that 
Title VIII's mandate to cure segregation means just that. 
Courts following the Eighth Circuit's "but for" standard are 
unlikely to accept a strict liability view of causation, as they are 
wedded to more traditional notions of fault and proof. In essence, 
the strict liability standard adopts a substantial cause analysis. If any 
act or inaction of HUD contributes to segregation, HUD causes 
segregation. While the Fifth and Sixth Circuits justify this by weigh-
ing the equities, the Eighth Circuit approach weighs the proof of 
actual causes. Thus, the Title VIII duty to administer affirmatively 
helps the plaintiffs prove applicant choice causation of desegrega-
tion, but it does not provide a sufficient proof in every court. To 
satisfy "but for" courts, the plaintiffs must show that applicant 
choice is such a major causal factor that only in its absence could 
desegregation occur. The following approach might satisfy the "but 
for" courts. 
C. Evidence Proving Applicant Choice is a Cause of Public Housing 
Segregation 
The applicant choice cases do not analyze the social forces 
affecting individual choice. They either presume that applicants for 
public housing will always choose to live in projects where their race 
predominates176 or that absent any evidence to the contrary, appli-
cant choice is neutral. 177 This Note proposes that HUD knows that 
a combination of the following social forces compel applicants to 
self-segregate, thus making HUD liable for applicant choice causa-
tion of segregation. 
175 Anderson v. City of Alpharetta, Ga., 737 F.2d 1530, 1536 (11th Cir. 1984). The court 
held that while HUD can violate Title VIII by funding discrimination, it violated no duty 
through "passive review." [d. As this case involved HUD regulatory oversight and approval 
of discriminatory changes in public housing construction plans, the court disregarded and 
negated the 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e)(5) duty to administer affirmatively as well as Executive Order 
12,259 codifying coverage of all regulatory activity by Title VIII. 
176 E.g., Middleboro Hous. Auth. v. Kentucky Comm'n on Civil Rights, 553 S.W.2d 57 
(Ky. Ct. App. 1977). 
177 E.g., Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. 1485, 1499 (W.D. Mo. 1984), overruled on other 
issues sub nom. Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986) (en banc); Blackshear 
Residents Org. v. Housing Auth. of the City of Austin, 347 F. Supp. 1138, 1144-45 (W.D. 
Tex. 1972). 
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A concern for personal safety forces minorities to avoid mostly 
white housing projects, usually located in all-white communities 
perceived by minonties as unsafe environments. 17S HUD's 
knowledge 179 and admission l80 of this dynamic could estop the 
agency from refuting this argument. Similarly, pervasive segrega-
tion in the entire housing market creates a hostile environment for 
minorities in virtually every white community and sharply limits 
their housing options. lSI This forces low-income minorities to apply 
for public housing and to accept offers in segregated projects. IS2 
The historic identification of the U.S. government with official seg-
regation, including public housing segregation, and the apparent 
federal endorsement of continued segregation, further discourages 
minorities from choosing predominantly white projects. IS3 
I7H Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 440 n.5 (1968) (while declining to rule 
freedom of chvice in public schooling per se unconstitutional, evidence of violence, threats 
and coercion prevented free choice for minority parents and students); NAACP, Boston 
Chapter v. Secretary of HUD, 817 F.2d 149, 151 (1st Cir. 1987) (one cause of segregation is 
lack of safe, desegregated housing in white neighborhoods). 
179 E.g., Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 425 F. Supp. 987, 1019 (E.D. Pa. 1976), afI'd in 
part, rev'd in part, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978) (violence and 
tension associated with integrated public housing no excuse for denying civil rights); Gau-
treaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907, 909 (E.D. III. 1969), afI'd, 425 U.S. 284 
(1976) ("history of tension, threats of violence and violence" cannot justify a government 
policy of segregation). 
180 R. LaPlante, Preliminary Determination of Title VI Non-Compliance Letter from 
Director, HUD Office of Fair Housing Equal Opportunity, to R. Flynn, Mayor of Boston 2-
3 (Oct. 14, 1987) (Boston Housing Authority cited "potential racial harassment or injury" as 
reason for not integrating projects);.J. Vera, Memorandum from Director, Region I Office 
of Fair Housing Equal Opportunity, HUD, to A. Monroig, Ass't Sec. for FHEO, Regarding 
Public Housing Authority Desegregation Efforts 3 (June 27, 1983) [hereinafter Vera, PHA 
Desegregation Efforts] ("Moving minority tenants into a non-minority area without having 
done the advanced ground work described above will lead to racial violence and defeat any 
progress that may have been made and will require years of delay before another attempt 
at integration can be made"). 
181 NAACP, Boston Chapter v. Secretary of HUD, 817 F.2d 149, 151 (1st Cir. 1987) 
(HUD knows that segregation increases minorities' housing needs); KUSHNER, FAIR HOUSING, 
supra note 71, at 658 ("The presence of segregation and pervasive discrimination chills the 
motivation of people to seek housing in nontraditional areas for lack of familiarity and fear 
of hostility"); Quill, supra note 9, at 17 (two studies, from 1982 and 1984, show minorities 
attempting to buy or rent in Boston encountered discrimination in eight of every ten at-
tempts). 
I"" "[T]he minority applicant, with few other options available, has accepted the vacancy 
first offered while the non-minority has been able to sit back and wait for the offer of his or 
her choice." Vera, PHA Desegregation Efforts, supra note 180, at 2; Comment, Discrimination 
in Public Housing, supra note 80, at 598 n.91 (in operation of Plan B, prior discrimination 
may restrict minority applicants' choice, creating segregation of public housing). 
183 See Title VIII Hearings, supra note 70, at 236-38. 
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Social science research indicates a strong preference among 
whites to live in all-white or predominantly white neighborhoods. 184 
Thus, white applicants will exercise available choice to maximize 
the chances of placement in a mostly white projecL I85 Under a Plan 
B TSAP system, the white applicants will refuse offers of mostly 
minority projects l86 at least until the third offer. The length of time 
needed to ascend from the bottom to the top of the waiting list 
could influence the third choice. Under a Plan B system with a short 
waiting list ascension time, white applicants could refuse a third 
offer to a mostly minority project, go to the bottom and wait a 
relatively brief time for a new round of offers. 187 The number and 
proportion of segregated projects also could affect the efficacy of 
applicant choice for individual self-segregation. For example, in 
Boston, where there are roughly thirty-three white developments 
and thirty-five minority developments,188 an applicant with three 
refusals would know that, discounting the smaller number of inte-
grated developments, there is a one in two chance each offer will 
be for a location where the applicant'S race predominates. An ap-
plicant seeking a segregated development will be under no pressure 
to accept the first two offers if they are for sites where the applicant 
is in the racial minority. She can simply wait for the next "coin toss." 
The principal social forces compelling self-segregation are com-
mon to all PHA systems. Across the United States a hostile environ-
ment exists for minorities in white areas du~ to safety concerns and 
widespread discrimination. The legacy of government discrimina-
tion in white projects and the reality of white preference for seg-
regation are also national phenomena. Due to these universal social 
IB, See, f.g., Burney v. Housing Auth. of Beaver, 551 F. Supp. 746, 766-67 (W.D. Pa. 
1982); Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 354 F. Supp. 941, 952 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd, 
484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973); R. Smolla, In Pursuit of Racial Utopias: Fair Housing, Quotas, 
and Goals in the 1980's, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 947 (1985); R. Smolla, Integration Maintenance: The 
Unconstitutionality of Benign Programs That Discourage Black Entry to Prevent White Flight, 1981 
DUKE L.J. 891. 
lB.' For example, in Holyoke, Mass., the ascension time is two to three months. In 1986, 
of the 26 applicants who refused offers (under a one-offer only system) and went to the 
bottom of the list, 24 were white. T. Rodick, Investigation Report Under Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 in the Matter of the Holyoke Hous. Auth. 18, Case Nos. 01-82-03-035-
340,01-82-12-108-340 (1983) [hereinafter Rodick, Investigation Report]. 
IR6 E.g., Banks v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175, 1185, aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 473 F.2d 963 
(6th Cir. 1972) ("Many whites do not desire to live on the east side [of Cleveland] and many 
Blacks are uncomfortable with the thought of living on the west side"). 
IB7 E.g., Rodick, Investigation Report, supra note 185, at 18. 
IH" Mooney, supra note 4, at I. 
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forces, applicant choice will yield a segregated housing system in 
any PHA with projects identifiable as white and minority. In such 
PHA systems, particular circumstances can only make applicant self-
segregation easier or more difficult, such as the waiting list ascension 
time and the proportion of minority to white projects. 
Normally, a government civil rights defendant is not liable for 
causal factors, such as these social forces, operating outside the 
defendant's control. Outside factors such as private housing market 
transactions can constitute "adventitious discrimination" which un-
der a "but for" analysis can absolve a government defendant of 
liability for causing segregation. 189 Green v. County School Board190 
clearly found, however, that under certain circumstances a govern-
ment defendant can use such outside factors to cause segregation. 
In Green, the defendant school board knew that racial violence, a 
hostile environment and the history of segregation frustrated free 
choice in the public school system for minority parents and com-
pelled whites and minorities to self-segregate. 191 In crafting a free-
dom of choice desegregation plan, the school board knew that these 
"outside" factors would result in continued segregation. 192 Accord-
ingly, the board was liable for causing segregation by relying on 
social forces normally "adventitious" and outside its control. By 
analogy, if HUD knows of the social forces that compel self-segre-
gation and if the agency creates a choice TSAP policy, HUD could 
be liable for the social forces' causation of public housing segrega-
tion. 
In a 1989 decision, NAACP, Boston Branch v. Kemp,193 the U.S. 
District Court for Massachusetts affirmed such a theory. Applying 
Title VIII's duty to administer affirmatively, the court found that 
one factor in HUD's breach of this duty was the lack of safe housing 
for minorities in white areas of Boston. 194 HUD's knowledge of this 
problem created a Title VIII duty to require Boston to use HUD 
funds to construct or otherwise effect integrated housing in white 
areas. 195 
189 See Days, School Desegregation Law, supra note 44, at 1760-61 (citing Keyes v. School 
Dist. No. I, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189,217 (1973) (Powell,].); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. 
Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 512 (1979) (Rehnquist,]., dissenting); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 
717,765 n.2 (1974) (Stewart, J.)). 
190 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
191Id. at 437. 
192 Id. at 439-42. 
193 No. 78-850-S, slip op. (D. Mass. June 23, 1989). 
194Id. at 15. 
195Id. at 2,6-7, 10-11, 15. 
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A similar theory could apply to HUD's TSAP policy. HUD 
dearly knows, or has breached a duty to know, of all the social 
forces compelling self-segregation. Title VIII requires that HUD 
"shall consult with state and local officials and other interested 
parties to learn the extent, if any, to which housing discrimination 
exists in their state or locality."196 If HUD meets this duty, it must 
know of private housing discrimination, racial violence, hostility 
towards minorities in white communities, and past government dis-
crimination in public housing. Knowledge of these forces would 
trigger HUD's duty to investigate the effects of its own policies l97 
and PHAs' policies l98 operating in conjunction with these social 
forces. The agency would then have a correspondingly higher duty 
to act to remedy the effects of its choice TSAP policy. Otherwise, 
to administer affirmatively is a meaningless mandate. 
If HUD does not meet these Title VIII duties to investigate, 
such breaches are causal factors aiding the plaintiffs' argument for 
"but for" causation. Courts can then impute knowledge to HUD as 
if the agency had conscientiously monitored the actions of PHAs 
and investigated the local housing market. 199 Thus, social forces 
compelling applicants for public housing to self-segregate warrant 
an inference of causation against HUD. This inference should be 
valid in every PHA system which has segregated projects and has 
utilized applicant choice, with HUD's approval, at some time in its 
history. 
IV. DEFENSES TO A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF ApPLICANT CHOICE 
CAUSATION OF SEGREGATION 
After the plaintiffs make a prima facie case for causation,20o 
HUD as defendant has the burden of showing that other forces 
196 42 U .S.C. § 3609 (1982). 
197 Exec. Order No. 12,259 § 1-301(b)(I) (1980), 3 C.F.R. 308 (1981), reprinted in 42 
U.S.C. § 3608 (1982); Young v. Pierce, 628 F. Supp. 1037, 1054-55 (E.D. Tex. 1985), aff'd, 
822 F.2d 1368 (5th Cir. 1987); cf Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1130 
n.ll, 1133-34 (2d Cir. 1973) (HUD not a party on appeal; PHAs must know of the effects 
of siting policies and no TSAP can "have the evident effect of excluding" minorities). 
198 Young, 628 F. Supp. at 1054-55. 
199 Cf id. 
200 A threshold defense is whether HUD enjoys sovereign immunity from any suit based 
on inadequate enforcement of Title VI. The weight of authority holds that HUD has waived 
any sovereign immunity. The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.c. § 706(2)(B) (1982), 
allows judicial review of agency actions "contrary to constitutional right." See, e.g., Jaimes v. 
Toledo Metro. Hous. Auth., 758 F.2d 1086, 1105 n.40 (6th Cir. (1985) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1404(a», aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 833 F.2d 1203 (6th Cir. 1987). But see Drayden v. 
Needville Indep. School Dist., 642 F.2d 129, 133 n.6 (5th Cir. 1981). 
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caused public housing segregation. 201 HUD could make four alter-
native arguments: if applicant choice was a cause, intervening causes 
have superseded it; applicant choice is a neutral policy; applicant 
choice may in fact be remedial; and desegregation is impossible. 
A. Intervening, Superseding Cause 
HUD's strongest defense is that, assuming arguendo that ap-
plicant choice is a causal factor, subsequent intervening factors have 
negated, overwhelmed or superseded applicant choice causation of 
segregation. If these independent forces would cause public hous-
ing segregation regardless of the existence of applicant choice, there 
is no "but for" causation regarding applicant choice.202 The prin-
cipal form of this intervening, superseding cause theory is that 
PHAs' illegal actions, such as discriminatory siting decisions,203 un-
equal services,204 and skipping policies,205 caused public housing 
segregation regardless of HUD policies. 206 Some courts have ac-
cepted such a defense, dismissing HUD on the grounds that reach-
ing a PHA or other local defendants could cure the injury and 
satisfy plaintiffs' demands. 207 The U.S. District Court for Southern 
201 Days, School Desegregation Law, supra note 44, at 1750-51. 
202 E.g., Jaimes v. Toledo Metro. HOllS. Auth., 758 F.2d 1086, 1106 (6th Cir. 1985) 
(proximate cause not shown at trial where no argument was made that alternative policies to 
Plan B would cause integration), aj['d in part, rev'd in part, 833 F.2d 1203 (6th Cir. 1987); 
accord, Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 433-34 (l976) (once desegre-
gation policy is adopted, subsequent changes in the racial mix might be caused by factors 
for which the defendants could not be responsible, citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1,24 (l971»; KUSHNER, FAIR HOUSING, supra note 71, at 91. 
203 According to an unpublished HUD study in 1980 of the metropolitan areas of Denver, 
St. Louis, Phoenix, and Columbus, Ohio, almost every siting decision made by local PHAs 
had the effect of increasing public school segregation. Flournoy & Rodrigue, Separate and 
Unequal, supra note I, at 25A. 
204 [d. at 26A. 
205 E.g., Banks v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175, 1182 (N.D. Ohio 1972), afi'd in part, rev'd in 
part on other grounds, 473 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1972); Boston PHA Signs Voluntary Compliance 
Agreement with HUD, 16 HOllS. & Dev. Rep. (WGL) 101 (1988); Kentucky Housing Authority 
Charged in Fair Housing Suit, 6 HOllS. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 835-36 (1979). 
2116 Anderson v. City of Alpharetta, Ga., 737 F.2d 1530 (lIth Cir. 1984). The reasoning 
in Anderson is questionable. HUD allowed a redesignation of federal funding from family 
housing to elderly. The court found that the redesignation resulted from discriminatory 
"obstructionist tactics of local officials." HUD had no liability because it had no "real ability 
to shape their [local officials'] decisions." [d. at 1534 n.5. Apparently the court did not consider 
HUD approval of funding redirection to be a direct act of HUD, and it chose to review 
under a minimum rationality standard despite the concededly discriminatory impact of the 
redesignation. [d. at 1536-37. 
207 Otero v. New York City HOllS. Auth., 354 F. Supp. 941, 957 n.18 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), 
rev'd, 484 F.2d 1122, 1131-32 (2d Cir. 1973) (it is unnecessary to reach HUD where the PHA 
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New York in Otero v. New York City Housing Authority208 found that 
the PHA superseded HUD's actions because HUD did not "affir-
mative[ly] discriminat[ e]. "209 The Second Circuit, in affirming Otero, 
stated that HUD has no regulatory duty to authorize PHA policies 
and is thus not liable for the effects of such policies.210 
The proposition that PHA actions can supersede HUD's actions 
is questionable. Before 1964, Public Housing Administration reg-
ulations emphasized local control over TSAPs.211 It is, however, 
plainly erroneous as a matter of law to assert, as Otero does, that 
HUD under Title VI has no duty to approve or to monitor PHA 
decisions regarding TSAPs.212 HUD is intimately involved in the 
PHAs' implementation of their TSAPs. 
The judicial decision not to reach HUD because other defen-
dants can remedy the harm may be reasonable in school desegre-
gation cases. Local school boards have the authority and responsi-
bility to desegregate without HUD approval of their acts. Such a 
finding of superseding cause, however, makes no sense where plain-
tiffs challenge HUD's own actions, mandated by its own regulations, 
in authorizing applicant choice TSAPs and monitoring the results 
of these policies. 213 
Another form of this intervening, superseding cause defense 
is that HUD breaks the causal chain once it ceases or modifies the 
challenged acts or policies. Once plaintiffs offer sufficient proof of 
a specific cause, however, defendant's remedial actions cannot ne-
gate the causation as long as the discriminatory effects continue. 214 
can provide "substantially complete relief," plaintiffs seek decree for future acts which PHA 
can perform alone, and there is no claim HUD "affirmatively violated" the law); Bank v. 
Housing Auth., 120 Cal. App. 2d 1,22,260 P.2d 668, 681 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 974 
(1954). The Otero rationale argues for reaching HUD where a TSAP is at issue, because 
PH As cannot change HUD regulations and guidelines and because there is ample evidence 
of HUD's "affirmative" failure to modify its admittedly ineffective TSAP policy. 
20R 354 F. Supp. 941, rev'd, 484 F.2d 1122. 
209 484 F.2d at 1128, 1130. 
2IOId. at 1130 n.11. 
211 E.g., Bank v. Housing Auth., 120 Cal. App. 2d at 22, 260 P.2d at 681. But see Heyward 
v. Public Hous. Admin., 238 F.2d 689, 695 (5th Cir. 1956). 
212 See supra notes 58, 68-69, 154-56, 163-66 and accompanying text. 
213 Cf. Adams v. Richardson, 356 F. Supp. 92 (D.D.C. 1973) (Under Title VI desegre-
gation order covering several school districts, Department of Health, Education and Welfare 
must closely monitor local school boards' effectiveness in desegregating), rev'd on other grounds, 
480 F.2d 1159, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1973), aff'd, _F.2d _(D.C. Cir. 1989) (federal duty to 
monitor still exists). 
214 Young v. Pierce, 628 F. Supp. 1037, 1059-60 (E.D. Tex. 1985), aff'd, 822 F.2d 1368 
(5th Cir. 1987) (valid causation and therefore standing against HUD despite HUD's initiation 
of remedial TSAP, due in part to the lack of success in past and the continuing segregation 
of PHAs). 
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The defendant has the "heavy burden" of proving that the effects 
of the challenged policy are no longer present.215 In Vann v. Housing 
Authority of Kansas City, Missouri,216 Hun won dismissal on grounds 
of no causation simply by modifying the TSAP from a freedom of 
choice system to a desegregation preference TSAP.217 This result, 
however, is unusual in that the ruling occurred before certification 
of the plaintiff class. When the two minority plaintiffs' residences 
became integrated after adoption of the desegregation preference 
TSAP, the court held no present effects existed. All the PH A's other 
projects remained segregated and plaintiffs disputed the cause of 
the limited integration in the plaintiffs' two projects.218 In cases 
where a plaintiff class is certified, Vann really stands for a very 
"heavy burden" of proof for defendant. To win dismissal, HUD 
must show actual integration has occurred in federally subsidized 
housing covering the entire class. 
Another variation of the intervening, superseding cause de-
fense would be the tort notion of proximate cause. Even if applicant 
choice were a partial cause of public housing segregation, HUD 
might be so far down the causal "chain" that it would be unfair to 
impose liability.219 HUn has made such an argument, citing prece-
dents where plaintiffs sued on a theory of vicarious liability.220 Young 
v. Pierce rejected this defense because Hun's acts in authorizing 
applicant choice were at issue, not just those of third parties, the 
PHAs.221 Hun is at the beginning, middle, and end of the chain of 
causation, due to its Title VI and Title VIII regulatory duties to 
approve and review PH As' TSAPs and other policies. 
A pattern of PHA violations of HUn's regulations is a powerful 
defense, as it suggests Hun was not the actual cause of segregation. 
215 628 F. Supp. at 1059-60; Vann v. Housing Auth. of Kansas City, Mo., 87 F.R.D. 642, 
657 (W.D. Mo. 1980) (citing DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974)) (dismissal only if 
"there is no reasonable expectation" that alleged violation will recur and if intervening acts 
have "completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation"). 
216 87 F.R.D. 642. 
217 [d. at 656-60 (relying on Bradley v. Housing Auth. of Kansas City, Mo., 512 F.2d 
626,628 (8th Cir. 1975)). 
218 [d. at 652-54. 
219 An analogy would be the situation of a drunk driver defendant who runs a car into 
an electric line pole, shutting off the power to a building a mile away, causing plaintiff's 
electric heat to fail, causing the water pipes to freeze and burst, causing extensive damage 
to plaintiff's apartment. Although the driver actually caused the damage to the apartment, 
the doctrine of proximate cause limits liability to the type of harm and to the type of victims 
normally foreseeable in automobile accidents. 
220 Young v. Pierce, 628 F. Supp. 1037, 1053-54 (E.D. Tex. 1985), aff'd, 822 F.2d 1368 
(5th Cir. 1987). 
221 [d. 
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Accordingly, a decisive issue in litigating causation is whether plain-
tiffs can convince a court that a "but for" standard of causation is 
impossible to prove, given the multiple factors at work, and there-
fore unfair to plaintiffs. The Fifth and Sixth Circuits' anti-choice 
line of cases seem most in tune with modern tort and desegregation 
principles of fairness. Thus, where plaintiffs can show that HUD 
substantially contributed to segregation, HUD should bear the bur-
den of remedying these injuries. 
In interpreting Title VI in conjunction with Title VIII, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has not clearly stated whether "but for" or "sub-
stantial cause" is the more appropriate standard. The Court has 
unambiguously embraced a substantial cause analysis in Title VI 
school desegregation cases.222 There is little doubt, however, that 
the Rehnquist Court today would likely favor a "but for" principle. 
For example, in Wards Cove Packing Company v. Antonio,'223 the Court 
found that to prevail in a Title VII employment discrimination case 
plaintiffs must identify specific discriminatory practices. Plaintiffs 
must also show that "each challenged practice has a significantly 
disparate impact."224 This analysis would reject the Young v. Pierce 
approach of lumping several factors together and finding each a 
substantial cause.225 It is possible, however, that under Wards Cove, 
once plaintiffs identify a specific discriminatory practice, they must 
then show only substantial cause. Justice White's words, "signifi-
cantly disparate impact,"226 could suggest a major ("significantly") 
contributing cause rather than a "but for" factor. "[S]ignifican[ t]" 
could refer to a large portion of the total disparate impact, implying 
partial causation. Alternatively, but less logically, it could describe 
the total amount of disparate impact, implying a standard of "but 
for" causation of all the segregation. 
In a case involving Title VIII, the Court might resolve this 
ambiguity in favor of plaintiffs and apply a substantial cause anal-
222 See Dayton Bd. of Education, 443 U.S. 526, 532-33, 538 (1979); Keyes v. Denver 
School District No.1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 189-202,211 (1973); Green v. County 
School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438, 440-41 n.5 (1968); accord University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 
438 U.S. 265, 331 (1977) (Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, JJ., concurring) (legislative history 
of Title VI cites government "complicity" in segregation, implying other causal factors). 
223 -U.S. _, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989). 
224Id. at _, 109 S. Ct. at 2125. 
225 The dissent in Wards Cove embraced the Young v. Pierce view. Justice Stevens argued 
that where there are several questionable practices, no single one must be the sole or primary 
cause. Together, all the challenged practices must "fortify" a plaintiff's assertion that the 
practices caused racial disparities. _U.S. at _, 109 S. Ct. at 2132-33. 
226Id. at _, 109 S. Ct. at 2125. 
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ysis, in order to implement the strong remedial intent of Con-
gress. 227 The plain meaning and legislative history of Title VIII 
certainly justify an application of substantial cause to bring about 
actual desegregation.228 The Rehnquist Court, however, is not very 
deferential to Congress in the civil rights area, if Wards Cove is any 
guide. If the Court were to apply "but for" causation to a challenge 
of HUD's applicant choice TSAP policy, plaintiffs nonetheless could 
prevail by showing that this policy had a "significantly disparate 
impact" on public housing segregation. The available evidence 
seems to prove such an impact conclusively.229 
B. Applicant Choice is Neutral and Presumed Constitutional 
The congressional supporters of Title VI in 1964 believed that 
once federal, state and local governments repudiated de jure seg-
regation, their adoption of formally neutral policies of nondiscri-
mination would satisfy Title VJ.230 Congress believed that once de 
jure segregation ended, applicants for public housing under free-
dom of choice plans could select a residence with no government 
coercion. Private choice alone would cause any resulting segrega-
tion. 231 As expressed in the constitutional law concepts that evolved 
later, race-neutral choice plans avoided the pitfalls of race-conscious 
separate but equal policies. The latter necessarily created racial 
classifications in violation of the equal protection clause. Taking this 
a step further, neutral nondiscrimination policies, such as applicant 
choice, cannot require certain racial results, i.e., actual desegrega-
tion, for this would constitute race-consciousness. Thus, the optimal 
cure for race-conscious segregation was race-neutrality in the form 
of applicant choice, regardless of the segregative effects.232 The 
Eighth Circuit adopted this view in Jenkins by Agyei v. State of Mis-
souri. 233 
227 See. e.g., Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972). 
228 See supra notes 154-69 and accompanying text. 
229 See supra notes 50-79, 176-98 and accompanying text. 
230 For example, Sen. Humphrey argued, "Title VI will have little or no effect on federally 
assisted housing" because the existing requirements of Executive Order 11,063 sufficed. 110 
CONGo REC. 6545 (1964). These requirements involved only the formal adoption of nondis-
crimination policies by PHAs. 
231 Comment, The Public Housing Administration, supra note 47, at 882. 
m E.g., Jenkins V. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. 1485, 1498-99 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (sufficient for 
PHA to adopt a desegregation preference TSAP), overruled on other issues sub nom. Jenkins by 
Agyei V. Missouri, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986) (en banc). 
233Id. 
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The Supreme Court today strongly favors race-neutral reme-
dies. The Court stated, however, in the 1989 case of City of Richmond 
v. J.A. Croson Company234 that it will allow race-conscious policies 
where there is a finding of past discrimination, alternative remedies 
have failed, the race-conscious policies are narrowly drawn, and 
Congress has mandated affirmative action.235 Clearly, the history of 
public housing segregation demonstrates that the federal govern-
ment, and PHAs, have discriminated in the past;236 that Congress 
has found this discrimination existed;237 that applicant choice has 
failed to cure the historic segregation of federally subsidized hous-
ing;238 and that Congress has mandated affirmative action by HUD 
to end this segregation.239 If plaintiffs can propose narrowly drawn 
race-conscious remedial policies,240 they could satisfy the constitu-
tional tests for race-conscious remedies under Croson. 
On a more fundamental level, courts should re-examine the 
idea that race-neutral government policies are preferable because 
they avoid racial classifications, which even in remedial contexts 
require strict scrutiny.241 It is clear that facially neutral practices 
often produce discriminatory results.242 Where segregation contin-
ues unabated under formally race-neutral policies, as with public 
housing in the United States, the preference for race-neutrality 
becomes an obstacle to nondiscrimination. To put it another way, 
234 _u.s. _, 109 S. Ct. 706 (l989) (O'Connor,]., writing for a majority) (city's set-
aside of construction contracts for minority businesses unconstitutional for lack of a finding 
of past discrimination against these businesses). 
235 [d. at _, 109 S. Ct. at 723-26. 
236 See supra notes 41-59,84-90 and accompanying text. 
237 See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text. 
238 See supra notes 72-79, 81-96 and accompanying text. 
239 See supra notes 154-69 and accompanying text. 
240 Narrowly drawn and more effective TSAPs are certainly possible. For example, HUD 
could require one waiting list for all housing programs, rather than separate ones for family, 
elderly, Section 8, and rent/mortgage subsidy programs. "Controlled choice" plans could 
allow applicants some choice but PH As would make offers so as to achieve integration. 
Compulsory transfers of groups of existing tenants can achieve desegregation. Ordering 
inter-district remedies, such as cross-district waiting lists, could desegregate suburban PHAs. 
In conjunction with these alternatives to choice TSAPs, HUD could exercise the Title VI 
power of withholding funds from a PHA or local government for noncompliance. 
241 University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290-91 (Powell, ].), 361-62 
(B1ackmun, Brennan, Marshall, White, J]', concurring) (l977). 
242 E.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 
265 (l977), on remand, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978); 
Clients' Council v. Pierce, 711 F.2d 1406, 1·~ I 0-21 (8th Cir. 1983); cf Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (l971) (nominally neutral job qualification test systematically excluded 
minority applicants and thus violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, despite the 
absence of proof of bad intent). 
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as Young v. Pierce concludes, it is much more accurate to characterize 
applicant choice as race-conscious, undeserving of any constitutional 
preference. 243 
The weaknesses of the pro-choice judicial analyses highlight 
the need for re-examining the standard preference for race-neu-
trality. For example, the Eighth Circuit in Jenkins v. Missouri244 up-
held the U.S. District Court for Western Missouri's finding that, 
despite over ten years of unabated segregation in Kansas City's 
public housing system under Plan B, this choice TSAP was still 
neutral and presumed constitutional. The Kansas City PHA broke 
the chain of causation merely by switching to another choice TSAP, 
a desegregation preference plan.245 Given the social forces compel-
ling public housing applicants to self-segregate, desegregation pref-
erence should simply maintain segregation. 
Some courts have undermined their affirmations of applicant 
choice neutrality through questionable findings of fact and of law. 
For example, Bell v. Board of Education, Akron Public Schools246 as-
serted in a conclusory manner that "no evidence" linked Plan B to 
pervasive segregation in the public housing of Akron, Ohio. The 
U.S. District Court for Northern Ohio and the Sixth Circuit Court 
of Appeals refused to find any connection between the ongoing 
segregation of public housing, the segregation of all neighborhoods 
in Akron, and the TSAP's special provision that applicants could 
choose a neighborhood. 247 In short, the logic of Bell, Jenkins and 
other pro-choice cases makes "race-neutrality" a judicial fig leaf 
covering the reality of segregation maintenance via applicant choice. 
C. Applicant Choice Is Remedial 
Some pro-choice decisions suggest that Plan B is remedial. This 
idea has some basis in the legislative history of Title VIII. Senate 
2401 628 F. Supp. 1037, 1054 (E.D. Tex. 1985), aff'd, 822 F.2d 1368 (5th Cir. 1987). 
244 593 F. Supp. 1485 (W.D. Mo. 1984), overruled on other issues sub nom. Jenkins by Agyei 
v. Missouri, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986) (en banc). 
245 [d. at 1498-99. 
246 491 F. Supp. 916 (N.D. Ohio 1980), aff'd, 683 F.2d 936 (6th Cir. 1982). 
247 [d. at 945, 683 F.2d at 946-47. In another poorly reasoned case, Blackshear Residents 
Organization v. Housing Authority of Austin, piaintiffs alleged that the PHA and HUD's use of 
Plan B concentrated tenants by race in particular projects and that defendants had refused 
to adopt affirmative procedures that would have reduced such racial concentration. 347 F. 
Supp. 1138, 1145 (W.D. Tex. 1972). The court found that the PHA intentionally discrimi-
nated through the irregular practice of allowing applicants to choose projects at the time of 
application. Despite the unifying method of applicant choice common to Plan B and this 
irregular practice, the court found that Plan B would not perpetuate segregation. The court 
asserted that new siting plans should end segregation, begging the questions of how to cure 
segregation in existing projects and how to integrate the new projects. [d. 
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hearings testimony in 1967 on Title VIII indicated Congress knew 
of and possibly approved of Plan B.248 Furthermore, the focus of 
civil rights leaders' testimony on private housing discrimination 
perhaps implied congressional satisfaction with public housing mea-
sures.249 
This analysis misreads the legislative history. Although Con-
gress knew of HUD's applicant choice regulations and guidelines, 
they were new and untested, adopted just that year. 250 A passing 
reference in hearings testimony with no questioning or debate by 
committee members cannot support a conclusion of congressional 
endorsement of Plan B. Also, in the floor debate congressional 
sponsors of Title VIII condemned the agency in the harshest terms 
for maintaining segregation.251 Rather than endorse HUD's deseg-
regation efforts, Congress indicated that they were grossly ineffec-
tive. 
HUD has also pointed to the disproportionately higher number 
of vacancies in white projects as evidence of the remedial nature of 
applicant choice. Plan B requires PHAs to make offers to applicants 
of apartments in projects with the greatest number of vacancies. 
According to HUD, this ensures that offers of apartments in white 
projects will be made to minority applicants. 252 Apparently no study 
has ever confirmed this factual assumption about disproportionate 
vacanCIes. 
248 Mr. Rutledge, a representative of the National Coalition on Housing Discrimination, 
an alliance of major civil rights organizations, including the NAACP, endorsed the general 
principle of choice: "[Pleople, regardless of race, creed, color or national origin, ought to 
have the right to live where they want to live .... [Hlousing choice or freedom of residence 
and increased housing supply are two sides of the same housing coin." Title VIII Hearings, 
supra note 70, at 222. The witness specifically described Plans A and B as part of new HUD 
activity "to affirmatively implement Title VI by a policy designed to desegregate public 
housing." [d. at 237. Mr. Rutledge further characterized Plans A and B as a response to 
pressure to improve enforcement of Title VI, giving these guidelines the apparent blessing 
of the civil rights movement: 
Now neither Title VI of the 1964 Act nor the 1962 executive order has been 
effectively used. The two instruments have achieved little more than two or three 
modest alterations of federal policy in selection of public housing sites and tenants. 
And these changes I assure you, came only after concerted representations, pressure, 
and legal actions by NCDH, its affiliates such as the NAACP and the NAACP Legal 
Defense Fund, Inc., and local Negro leadership in many cities. 
Id.at218. 
249 See generally Title VIII Hearings, supra note 70. 
250 See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text. 
251 See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text. 
252 Young v. Pierce, 628 F. Supp. 1037, 1045 (E.D. Tex. 1985), ajj'd, 822 F.2d 1368 (5th 
Cir. 1987); United States v. Housing Auth. of Albany, Ga., 1 Equal Opp'y Hous. (P-H) 
~ 13,580,13,817,13,819 (D.C. M.D. Ga., No. 1007, Jan. 16, 1973). 
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Even if the presumed vacancy proportion were true, HUD's 
argument that Plan B is therefore remedial is questionable. HUD 
assumes that minorities will accept offers in white projects. This 
ignores the social forces that pressure minorities to avoid accepting 
offers in mostly white projects. 253 Also, in elaborating this argument 
HUD has acknowledged that mostly minority projects will remain 
segregated because white applicants will refuse assignment there.254 
This admission estops HUD from denying that Plan B causes tenant 
segregation in predominantly minority projects. 
D. Impossibility of Desegregation 
Government defendants in civil rights cases cannot escape lia-
bility by claiming that white racism prevents desegregation.255 Such 
a defense would cater to racism in violation of the equal protection 
clause.256 A more plausible impossibility defense is that the defen-
dant's concerted good faith efforts have been unsuccessful and that 
lack of resources and other constraints make desegregation impos-
sible. 
HUD's regulations allow PHAs to assert this impossibility de-
fense in Title VI compliance reviews. The PHA "may produce 
evidence which indicates it expended every imaginable good faith 
effort to eliminate the [racial] disparity to no avail."257 Through 
public statements, HUD officials have justified HUD's own lack of 
success at desegregation with this impossibility defense.258 As a de-
fense in court, however, this argument is weak. In Adams v. Rich-
ardson,259 the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals rejected 
20' See supra notes 176-98 and accompanying text. 
254 There were some assumptions about race which underlay the adoption of the 
1967 policy [Plan B]. It was assumed that in many cities the local housing authorities 
had black projects with long waiting lists and white projects with no waiting lists at 
all. It was assumed that offers of units in white projects would overcome the re-
luctance of blacks to move into such projects, resulting in the desegregation of the 
previously white projects. The policy was not designed to desegregate black projects. 
Young v. Pierce, 628 F. Supp. at 1045 (citing R. COVELL, OFFICE OF HUD PROGRAM COMPLI-
ANCE, A MANAGEMENT CONTROL ASSESSMENT OF THE HUD TENANT SELECTION AND ASSIGN-
MENT POLICY (Dec. 14, 1981)) (emphasis added). 
255 E.g., Greater Gadsden, I Equal Opp'y Hous. (P-H) at 13,902-03. 
256Id. at 13,903 (citing Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450, 459 (1968)). 
257 Tucker, Memorandum on Nondiscrimination, supra note 120, at 4. 
25R E.g., Flournoy & Rodrigue, Separate and Unequal, supra note 1, at 24A, col. I (statement 
of Samuel Pierce, former Secretary of HUD). 
259 356 F. Supp. 92 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973), 
a/I'd, _F.2d _(D.C. Cir. 1989) (plaintiffs retain standing to compel federal agency to 
monitor local boards). 
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the Department of Health, Education and Welfare's (HEW) impos-
sibility defense. HEW had negotiated a voluntary desegregation 
plan with several local school systems. During four years of this 
compliance program, segregation persisted while HEW failed to 
collect basic data on the schools' racial composition and to monitor 
the local school boards' actions.260 The Adams court found that 
HEW, "having failed during a substantial period of time to achieve 
voluntary compliance, has a duty to commence enforcement pro-
ceedings."26! By analogy, Adams suggests that because HUD has 
known since 1969 that applicant choice contributes to segrega-
tion,262 by 1973 HUD had a duty to take reasonable measures to 
break this causation. HUD of course has taken no measures to end 
choice TSAPs. 
HUD's possible defenses to causation all have major weak-
nesses, but nonetheless some courts may accept them. The Eighth 
Circuit, by imposing a tough "but for" standard of proving causation 
on the plaintiffs, more likely will accept a superseding cause de-
fense. Although the Supreme Court's recent rulings on causation 
standards are ambiguous, the Court clearly would favor a standard 
similar to the Eighth Circuit's. Due to the Supreme Court's disfa-
voring of race-conscious policies, courts may give great weight to 
HUD's justifications of applicant choice as remedial and race-neu-
tral. Despite the impermissibility of impossibility defenses that cater 
to racism, conservative members of the Supreme Court have ruled 
that private discrimination often prevents desegregation with no 
liability accruing to a government defendant. 263 Alternatively, if 
stare decisis retains any vitality on the Rehnquist Court, Green v. 
County School Board could support a finding that HUD utilizes pri-
vate choices to segregate public housing. Thus, the plaintiffs' success 
in proving causation may depend on the philosophical leanings of 
the court hearing a case. 
V. CONCLUSION 
While plaintiffs and commentators have often focused on siting 
of new housing projects in one-race neighborhoods as a cause of 
public housing segregation, applicant choice TSAP policies are also 
260 [d. at 94. 
261 [d. But see Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972); cf Burney 
v. Housing Auth. of Beaver, 551 F. Supp. 746, 761 (W.D. Pa. 1982). 
262 See supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text. 
263 See Days, School Desegregation Law, supra note 44, at 1759-61. 
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a causal mainstay of HUD's segregation maintenance policy. With 
a careful analysis of applicant choice practices and a thoughtful 
application of accepted principles of causation, plaintiffs could con-
struct an effective Title VIII theory of HUD liability for public 
housing segregation. Such a theory could encompass all federally 
supported public housing in the U.S., because all PHAs adopted 
choice TSAPs from 1964-1967, because most PHAs presumptively 
have utilized choice TSAPs since 1967, and because any HUD re-
vision of its TSAP regulations would affect all PHAs. As a cost-
effective means of desegregating public housing, the replacement 
of applicant choice by race-conscious remedial TSAPs could avoid 
the chief constitutional obstacle to plaintiffs' recovery, heavy finan-
cial burdens on PHAs, local governments and HUD. White and 
minority public housing tenants and applicants would benefit di-
rectly from new opportunities for integrated housing and could 
benefit collaterally from the fruits of a renewed judicial commitment 
to fair housing. 
The decisive factors in any legal challenge to HUD's TSAP 
policies would be the judicial determinations of two key issues: the 
standard of causation, either "but for" or "substantial cause"; and 
the existence of an ongoing mandate since Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation, renewed by the passage of Title VI and Title VIII, to deseg-
regate the entire system of federally supported public housing. 
Given the apparent unwillingness of Congress or the executive 
branch to act, the crucial ingredient to ending HUD's policy of 
segregation maintenance will be a judicial commitment to apply 
rather than erode the principles of fairness embodied in these 
landmark statements of our national civil rights policy. 
David W. Price 
